


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REVIEW

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FIFTY-NINTH YEAR

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THE UTAH PROBLEM: WHY IT REMAINS UNSOLVED.

IN 1846-7, having been outlawed in the States where they had previously attempted to establish themselves, a motley company of men and women took up the line of march for a country where, it was fondly hoped, in the development of the peculiar ideas which formed their bond of union, they would be free from the unwelcome interference of law and public opinion. California, then a part of Mexico, was the Mecca of their hopes, and dreams of a Mormon empire upon the Pacific Coast consoled the followers of the so-called "Prophet of God" for the loss of the homes from which they fled, and the hardships of their wilderness journey.

A study of the elements composing this hegira would open one of the most remarkable chapters in the phenomena of social science. We should here find proof that however singular, revolutionary, or irrational, in the judgment of the average man, may be the views of any individual member of society, if the opportunity be given, as when such a person possesses the qualifications of a leader and the gifts of a propagandist, unsuspected elements will be in readiness to be moulded to them. The power which the self-constituted apostles of the most startling social and religious theories are able to thus exercise over so large a number of their fellows is not to be accounted for by any mere generalization; and to legislate against the errors into which men are thus led upon the basis of such generalizations is a grievous error. Erratic tendencies in the human mind are constitutional, and in minds possessing such tendencies there is the same inherent disposition toward homogeneity and association which is characteristic of other men. To account for the

existence of this erratic element, or to say why it is especially attracted to this or that particular error, is a problem in social science which need not be discussed in this paper. The element and the tendency exist, and we find the logical result in social evolutions like that which has for more than forty years presented itself for the study of the American people, and has resulted in an organization which has proven itself able to survive the repeated assaults of law and to grow strong in the face of an overwhelming adverse sentiment.

It is a matter of history that ten thousand or more men, women, and children, denied the protecting ægis of the law in the profession and practices of a faith which they claimed to be founded on the most conscientious convictions, began an exodus which was intended to place them beyond the reach of the statutes with which that faith was in conflict; that the land of promise which they sought became subject to the United States while they were journeying toward it; that they stopped in their course in a remote and uninhabited portion of the national domain; and, where mountain barriers and leagues of wilderness lay between them and those whom they regarded as their persecutors, resolved to re-erect the altar of their faith and to lay the foundations of a State over whose affairs they should exercise such control as to secure for themselves and their children immunity from the dangers threatened by adverse laws and hostile sentiment.

As we step back into history and look upon the legions which, thirty-six years ago, poured over the Wasatch Mountains and descended into the fair valley below, what do we find them to be, and what shall we say of them? Are we prepared to weigh the motives which urged those beating hearts over a long and weary way into this wilderness with a judgment which shall be generous while it is just? A judgment which takes no account of the most trying and important period in Mormon history can be of little value; that based on mere prejudice is unworthy; and one founded on the strictest interpretation of the law, while legally just, may be most ungenerous. Those who would form a judgment of the members of the Mormon organization, which shall be in accordance with the canons of political wisdom and of Christian charity, are invited to look

upon these thousands encamped under the shadows of the Wasatch Mountains a generation ago. What of the men who have toiled with un murmuring bravery for months, through dangers of ambush and storm and flood, on their westward way? are these all pretenders and knaves, or the willing dupes of such? Does this theory, or the idea of lust suggested by the doctrine of polygamy (subsequently announced, and never practised by more than a fraction of the Mormon population), afford a sufficient explanation of the spirit which animates this multitude to espouse a common cause, to accept obloquy and exile, and to meet the perils of the wilderness in the face of approaching winter? In this stubborn adherence to a common purpose; in this fierce battle with adverse circumstances; in this devotion to wives and children, do we find evidence to warrant the belief that the aged men, the stalwart husbands, and the youth of this great company are moved solely or chiefly by the lowest and basest of aims? These hundreds of gray-haired women in the passionless calm of old age; these many mothers with patient endurance bearing their part in the struggles of this strange life, and caring tenderly for their babes; these young wives adhering to the fortunes of their husbands; the maidens found in so many of these scattered groups,—are these representatives of woman-kind unreasoning bond-creatures or depraved women whose chief mission is to minister to the caprices and passions of base, hypocritical, and brutal men? Is all of this endurance of trial with a devotion approaching to heroism the outcome of charlatanism, hypocrisy, and libertinism? Are the prayers and hymns of these people nothing but a studied mockery cast in the face of heaven?

He who will answer these questions in the affirmative must be a blind student of nature and human history. To account for a socio-religious movement like that which led these ten thousand people into the wilderness, casting themselves upon the future with a faith or daring, however we regard it, equally wonderful, requires an inspiration based upon something deeper and stronger than the altogether grovelling and mercenary motives which suffice to unite the fortunes of those who are only adventurers or knaves. Whatever the honesty or sincerity of those who moulded the belief of these thousands into its eccen-

tric form, as they enter and take possession of Utah, they present the unmistakable evidences of a faith founded on sincere conviction.

Such was the beginning of the history of Mormonism in Utah. Imposition upon credulity there doubtless was; ambition, charlatanry, and lust, each may be supposed to have had its place; but nothing short of a belief to which men and women gave themselves without reserve could have accomplished the results seen, and only this, taken in connection with the mistaken policy of the government and the people of the United States, can account for the subsequent marvellous growth of the Mormon organization.

The Mormon population of Utah from about eleven thousand in 1850 had increased in 1880 to a little over one hundred and twenty thousand out of a total of nearly one hundred and forty-four thousand. In place of a wilderness we find a vast cultivated domain threaded by highways and railroads. The wild lands of 1846 in 1880 yielded a product in cereals of nearly two million bushels, and in precious metals a value of nearly \$9,500,000. As early as 1879 (the only figures as to this item at hand) the total value of the assessed property of the Territory was \$24,985,072. From the number of 13 only in 1850, the public schools of the Territory had increased in 1880 to 390, maintained at a cost, for all classes, of more than \$200,000. And these results have been chiefly due to the enterprise and thrift of a people expelled as outlaws from Illinois, and who have been under the ban of the law during most of their sojourn in Utah.

History affords few examples of the growth, from such humble foundations, of a fabric, based on a religious idea, so important and so enduring as that which originated in the pretended revelations announced as made thirty-three years ago to one Joseph Smith, an obscure resident in a country town of Seneca County, New York. Born in 1830 of imposture and credulity; cast out from the place of its birth immediately after; driven in contumely from its refuge in Kirtland, Ohio; buffeted in Missouri, and driven to Illinois; baptized in the blood of the Nauvoo riots, and compelled in the beginning of its virile strength to fly into the wilderness, and there developing into what it is to-day; with whatever contempt we may regard its

origin, with whatever loathing we may look upon its accursed doctrines, we are compelled to confess that there is something in the Mormon organization which demands for its adherents, in spite of its abhorrent features, a degree of respect and consideration.

Had a policy based upon a reasonable degree of such respect and consideration prevailed in the Nauvoo era of the sect's history, is it probable that subsequent results would have been changed? And is it expedient to permit ideas of consideration and toleration to temper present dealings?

A picture, which we may doubtless accept as a fair one, of the Mormon Church at Nauvoo, was presented in the diary of the late Josiah Quincy, published in the *Independent* a year or more ago. His dispassionate judgment did not lead him to the conclusion so general in those days that the followers of Joseph Smith were for the most part cut-throats, marauders, and libertines; on the contrary, while finding in their fanatical ardor that which opposition might develop into a disturbing element in society, he credits them with qualities such as temperance, industry, and thrift, which are among the most important essentials to good citizenship. What if this eccentric community, with its commingled elements of good and evil, had been permitted to establish itself in Nauvoo, free to develop its theories, in so far as they did not involve illegal acts, and in so far as they did, amenable to the law, but without illegal or suprallegal interference?

Individual eccentricity, in all well-ordered communities, so long as it does not lead to breaches of the law, is tolerated. If every man whose mind flies, at any given time, outside the even circle of ordinary thought should be adjudged a madman or condemned as an outlaw, the number of actual and hopeless madmen and outlaws would be so indefinitely increased as to involve society in a perpetual struggle with its erratic elements. Toleration not only prevents such results, but in the end has the effect of bringing thousands of erratic minds back to a natural and healthful course of thought and action. However delicate the questions which arise when we pass from the treatment of cases of eccentricity which are segregate to those which meet us in an aggregated form, the rule of toleration within the

limits of the law, whether judged from the standpoint of political wisdom, humanity, or Christian charity, applies here not less than in the case of the individual. The best safeguard against error and its results is the influence of truth; and the magnetic current of truth which mingles with the common-sense of the people in every circle of society, in a land like this, may be trusted, sooner or later, without the aid of means outside, or, in the natural course of things, extra proceedings within, the law, to prevent the propagandists of error, however they may associate, from doing serious injury to society. The truth of this statement is attested by the history of the many organized movements in opposition to the common-sense of the people, and in a greater or less degree obnoxious or illegal, which have sprung up in the United States, with boastful expectations, and under the influence of an orderly popular sentiment, supported by the impartial administration of the law, been irresistibly forced into conformity with law and public opinion, or driven out of existence.

The Oneida Community—a notable instance—during all of the Mormon controversy, in the midst of one of the most prosperous and intelligent communities in the State of New York, openly defied popular sentiment, and covertly transgressed the law, by the maintenance of a social system as abhorrent as that of polygamy. Its members were not mobbed, they were not terrorized in the name of the law, they were not driven into exile by persecution; and free contact with the healthful currents of the life about them has finally resulted in the disintegration of that portion of their social fabric which was maintained in opposition to law and the sentiment of their neighbors. If, by the exercise of mob law, the Oneida Community had been driven, thirty years ago, into one of the Territories, beyond the reach of the influences under which it is compelled to yield; and had for the greater part of that time had full opportunity for such growth as it could have secured, there is no reason for believing that the vicious features of its doctrines would have worked so little harm or been so soon abandoned.

Had the treatment of the Mormon community at Nauvoo been similar to that accorded to the community at Oneida, the irresistible influence of a hostile public sentiment, and of laws

humanely exercised, would undoubtedly have made the Mormon problem a matter of little concern. To assert the contrary is to assume that law is inadequate to the protection of a community from overt acts, and that the barriers of religion and morality are insufficient for the protection of an overwhelming majority against the contaminating influence of a generally despised minority.

We have said enough to warrant the statement that the people and authorities of Illinois are in a measure responsible for the development of a structure whose abnormal features, capable of but a sickly life, and destined to sure decay in that State, were driven to deeper root by persecution, and to free growth by exile. It is evident that the treatment of the Mormon organization by the government and people at the time of its permanent establishment, which dates from the Nauvoo period, was, aside from considerations of Christian charity and humanity, lamentably wanting in political wisdom.

We turn now to the subsequent period of Mormon history. Driven into the wilderness; incited to the fanatical adherence with which men characteristically cling to the doctrines which have made them the subjects of persecution; isolated from the surroundings calculated to modify, and finally to change, the drift of sentiment,—we find them in a domain wide enough for a kingdom, and practically as far from the seat of authority as if responsible to a power beyond the sea.

In the light of the fires kindled at Nauvoo, it would seem that statesmanship would have discovered a necessity for the adoption of measures calculated to restrain the tendencies toward evil evident in this virile and growing power on the nation's frontier, and to prevent it from developing, as there was plain reason to fear that it would, into a social organization adhering to a religious code, which must inevitably sooner or later bring it into open conflict with the laws of the land.

But where, in the records of Congress or upon the statute-books, is there any evidence of the really serious and statesman-like consideration which this phenomenal social movement demanded? Here is a people openly seeking a refuge where

they will be free to disregard the popular opinion left behind them, and to transgress the laws of the government to which they owe allegiance. Are restricting influences provided? Does the government, in the exercise of its legitimate authority, assume quiet but unmistakable jurisdiction over its territory, seized and appropriated in advance of any form of title? Does it guard against the realization of the boasted dreams of extended domain and self-government entertained by this law-defying people, by erecting guards against undue encroachment on the public domain, and by providing a government with the necessary machinery for securing the impartial reign of law and order? Were provisions made which would encourage the immigration into this garden-land of any portion of the law-abiding thousands who were landing upon our shores, and whose presence in Utah would have been a bulwark against, and an ultimate cure of, the evils of Mormonism?

The facts are the best answers to these questions. First, we find that anomaly in American history, the hierarchical and independent government permitted for three years to act its own will, with graceless conformity to such federal laws as did not interfere with the plans of its leaders, exercising authority under the name of the "State of Deseret." Second, we find this illegal government in 1850, under cover of laws framed to suit the plans of men more astute than the members of Congress who blindly enacted them, cunningly overlaid by a "territorial government," beneath whose framework, as under the ribs of the wooden horse which decided the fate of Troy, were concealed and brought within the domain of recognized law—in the substance of the abrogated code of Deseret—enemies of good government sufficient to account for the present condition of Utah. Third, with a power strengthened because used under statutes approved by Congress, we see a government, as essentially Mormon as that of the so-called State of Deseret, established and continued to this day in the exercise of supreme executive, legislative, and judicial control throughout the Territory. Fourth, we see schemes devised and executed, with little opposition, by which the choicest acres of the Territory are converted into the property of the church and held for distribution among, and, prior to this, as inducements for the immigration of, converts to

the Mormon faith. By evading the provisions of government land-acts, for the above and other purposes, through the perversion of laws relating to incorporated towns and in every other way possible, we see the Mormons come into possession of an area vastly beyond the wants of their population, and including, as shrewdly prearranged for, so large a part of the arable soil of the Territory as to threaten the ultimate closing of the door to an immigration not welcome. Fifth, we find a system of public schools established under laws whose provisions are capable of being so construed as to debar non-Mormons from becoming teachers, and which, in violation of a fundamental principle of our government, are used for the propagation of religious tenets. Sixth, we find, as clearly evidenced in a letter addressed to the writer by John Taylor, the successor to Brigham Young, and the head of the church (published by him in the course of a controversy in the newspapers of Salt Lake City), a power entrenched which assumes to administrate the judicial laws upon the territorial statute-book, but which uses the trust to abuse it by the substitution of religious tribunals which, if not secret, are open only to the audience of the faithful. Finally, we behold in Utah, as represented by the managers of the Mormon organization, a power which is monarchical in its assumption and exercise of authority, and which believes itself strong enough to defy interference with its structure or its schemes.

And this is the outcome of national legislation as applied to affairs in Utah during the last thirty years! An absence of wise legislation in the beginning, then laws calculated to suit the use of those whom they should have controlled, and now a people of law-breakers waxed strong and maintaining an attitude of defiance to authority in the face of anathemas from the pulpit, oburgations from the press, and a hot fusillade of ineffective enactments from the halls of Congress!

In view of the facts, we venture to affirm that the responsibility for the present condition of affairs does not wholly lie at the door of the Mormon Church, and much less at the doors of those who constitute the mass of the Mormon people. The individual members of that church are for the most part, whatever the prevailing opinion may be, as sincere in their adher-

ence to the doctrines which have been accepted by their credulous minds as are the Hindus in their belief in the divinity of the Veda. An epidemic of error, like that which has seized upon their minds and turned them from normal conditions, is not a solecism in history. Instances where apostles of strange doctrines have led men captive by thousands, and held their minds in thrall for periods varying in length, will occur to every reader. Schisms and errors of all descriptions, from those which offend against ecclesiastical canons to those which outrage moral sentiment and transgress civil law, are a part of the strange ordering of affairs which permits evolutions in human thought as eccentric and unexplainable as the character of the erratic bodies which appear and disappear in the heavens. The more than fifty thousand men and women (actual adult members of the Mormon Church) who blindly follow the lead of the apostles of a religion whose doctrines are at variance with the laws of the land, merely present a marked instance of what has occurred many times, and may occur often in the future, when doctrines suited to the purpose are instilled into minds that need only the occasion to bring them into cohesion. In the light of the teachings of social science, the success of the Mormon Church is only phenomenal because of the circumstances under which it has been attained, and for these phenomenal circumstances, justice demands that the responsibility be laid at the door of the government and people of the United States.

A young oak may lodge itself by the foundations of our house. As the result of our apathy, preoccupation, or want of foresight, it may be permitted to grow deep into the soil, to obtrude its roots beneath our walls, and, as it grows upward, to afford support to a poisonous vine. Under the circumstances, when the oak's uplifting roots threaten a breach in the wall, and the vine exhales deadly poison, if house and occupants suffer, where does the fault lie? Surely the mischief wrought by the vital forces which some freak of nature has planted at our side, is to be attributed not so much to that which is inherent in the nature of things as to our own fault in not taking proper preventive measures at the right time. Nevertheless, it will be said, oak and vine must be hewn down. True, as to

the material elements which threaten our dwelling; but the simile, while it clearly indicates where the responsibility for their thrifty growth lies, does not apply when we seek a remedy for the evils wrought and threatened by the Mormon oak and its polygamous vine. Axe and fire are not the instruments with which to cure the ills which our own supineness, want of statecraft, and mislegislation, have permitted to burrow beneath the walls and to poison the air of the state. Proscriptive legislation may drive conscious outlaws into unwilling obedience to civil mandates, but if applied to fatuous transgressors who base disobedience on religious convictions, when they are represented in a union of thousands of consciences, may produce a contrary result by making outlaws of citizens enough to form a kingdom, and invite a struggle which, while it could have but one ending, would be as unwelcome, unwise, and inhuman, as unnecessary.

A government which is itself largely responsible for evils which it seeks to cure is in duty bound to consider well and act wisely in the application of remedies. But while the responsibility of the government and people of the United States binds them to the application of a cure for the evils invited which shall not be intolerant or inhuman, it does not forbid the use of effective remedial measures suggested by political expediency and in keeping with Christian charity.

The consideration of such measures may begin with the axiom, That to tolerate error where truth surrounds it is the best means for its destruction. But for its isolation from vital contact with truth, the evil in Mormonism would have long since sunk out of sight. The remedy of first importance, then, lies in the adoption of measures which shall bring the people of Utah into contact with truth as truth is represented in the healthful, permeating, conquering common-sense of the average American citizen. Such measures are not difficult of adoption. Notwithstanding the pre-emption of so large a portion of the best arable lands of the Territory by adherents of the Mormon Church, there is yet a large and fertile acreage open for settlement. To ensure the occupancy of these wide and inviting fields by thrifty, sturdy settlers opposed to the unlawful tenets of Mormonism, laws relating to grants may be so amended as

to prevent sales to those who are not prepared to prove their intention to become, without reserve, supporters of law and order. Still further to encourage immigration of the desired character, exceptional inducements in the acquisition of lands may be offered to American citizens disposed to engage in agricultural pursuits or in the development of the vast and inestimably rich mineral resources of the Territory. As the result of inducements and restrictions such as those indicated, it is safe to say that, in a brief time, the population of Utah would be surrounded with a battery of influences whose electric currents would act with irresistible force in hastening the establishment of a normal condition of things. Another essential step toward remedying the present evils is to secure for Utah a popular government, conceived and administered in accordance with the spirit of the laws provided for the governing of the people of the other States and Territories. To secure a government of this character, aside from certain changes in its present constitution, will require a law-abiding majority among the voters of the Territory. The total polygamous vote, assuming that in a contest between Mormon and anti-Mormon candidates the Mormon vote would be practically unanimous, is at this time, as nearly as can be ascertained, not greater, and probably less, than twenty-five thousand, while the anti-Mormon vote is about twenty-four hundred. Female suffrage accounts for, it may be safely assumed, one fourth of the vote first named, while it affects the latter vote to a degree scarcely perceptible. The disfranchisement of women would, therefore, reduce the Mormon vote to less than nineteen thousand, or to nearly the actual vote cast for the Mormon representative in 1880. It is evident, therefore, that the increase of the anti-Mormon vote by sixteen thousand five hundred would in a general election overcome the Mormon majority. Such a change would not, it is true, immediately deprive the polygamists of control in the Legislature, but its effect would be to introduce into it an element which would speedily make its power felt, which would afford active support to the Governor and his adjutants, and whose influence would soon divide the already dissentient Mormon elements, in so far as wise legislation relating to polygamy is concerned, by winning the co-operation of the vast and increasing majority of non-polygamous Mormons, while the introduction and natural

increase of such an element in the assembly would of itself lead to rapid and wholesome changes. A wide discretion left in the hands of the Governor as to the use of the veto power, and the appointment to that position of a man of requisite wisdom and integrity, would put it in the power of the executive to defeat any attempt at improper legislation. Finally, provision should be made by which the public schools shall cease to be used in the interest of a religious faith. This can be best accomplished, and the efficiency of the system at the same time greatly increased, by placing the office of Superintendent on the same footing with the other executive offices; its incumbent to be appointed by the President. The administration of such an officer, if he be properly qualified, and if he shall be supported by provision for the withholding of public funds from schools which instruct in matters of religion, and have also the power to veto the appointment of improper teachers; would so change the character of the schools of Utah as to make them efficient means for breaking down such of the influences of Mormonism as are pernicious, instead of, as now, a potent means for their propagation.

The application of these remedies would not interfere with the more essential features of the Edmunds bill. That that bill alone would fail to afford a solution of the Mormon problem was inevitable. Enactments whose enforcement depends, in the ordinary use of civil processes, upon favorable local sentiment, to be effective without the aid of something like martial law, must have the support of a sufficient modicum of the right sentiment. If this essential element is wanting, until it can be brought into existence, unwelcome enactments will of necessity be made operative with such difficulty, in the absence of military force, or its equivalent, as to prove practically ineffective. The introduction of the law-abiding elements necessary to secure their enforcement would give validity to the best features of the Edmunds bill,¹ as to all other wholesome laws; would render the disfranchisement of actual polygamists less difficult; and obedience to the statutes would be increased accordingly. The continued absence of such elements in the population of Utah,

¹ Without attempting a discussion of the various provisions of this bill, it may be remarked that there is grave question as to the constitutionality of measures intended to exclude from juries those professing the Mormon faith.

aside from other considerations to which we have called attention, will in itself secure the comparative failure of the recent Congressional enactments as remedial measures.

In conclusion, the means now necessary for the cure of the existing evils in Utah may be summarized as follows: First, Congressional enactments which shall offer special inducements to an agricultural and mining population opposed to the law-defying features of Mormonism, and which shall provide restrictions preventing further sales of government land to a population not of the character indicated. Second, the abrogation of the present constitution or such of its features as are designed for the benefit of Mormons, including female suffrage, and the substitution of laws not capable of such easy perversion in the interests of a law-defying organization. Third, the investment of the executive officers of federal appointment with the widest authority for the correction of abuses consistent with the spirit of our institutions. Fourth, a change in the office of Superintendent of Public Schools which shall make its incumbent a federal officer, and the placing of such power in his hands as shall secure the schools from danger of perversion, to use for illegitimate ends, by any class or sect.

The application of these or equivalent measures, with an allowance of sufficient time, must accompany attempts to enforce penal statutes like those provided in the Edmunds bill, or the enforcement of these statutes, in the face of a defiant population of one hundred and twenty thousand souls, may be expected to precipitate a conflict which will not soon terminate, will drive desirable settlers from the Territory, reduce its people to a state of active outlawry, and prove in other ways disastrous to the best interests of the Territory and the nation. The people, through their representatives in Congress, have before them three alternatives: that of applying remedies like those proposed or their equivalent; that of permitting the recent enactments, for reasons stated, to become nugatory while defiance to law shall continue; or that of subjecting the people of the Territory to a reign of military authority which shall kindle the fires of religious fanaticism, prevent desirable immigration, and continue for an indefinite period. Of these alternatives which will they accept?

HENRY RANDALL WAITE.

A NEW EXPERIMENT IN EDUCATION.

THE title of this article refers to an experiment which has been conducted during the last five years in New York under the auspices and chiefly with the support of members of the society for Ethical Culture. With the initiation of the enterprise the heart had quite as much to do as the head. Those who entered upon it were inspired by the hope of contributing in some degree to the relief of the masses, and were impressed with the belief that an improved educational system is the most efficacious means to this end, indeed the only measure that promises to pluck up the poisonous weed of pauperism at the root.

Having started, however, with a purpose dating from the heart, the supporters of the new school¹ are well aware that their work can only prosper if it receives the sanction of the ablest minds, and that no generosity of intention can recommend an undertaking unless the ideas on which it is based will bear examination in the clear, cold light of the intellect.

The following pages have been written with a threefold purpose: first, to bring the experiment to the notice of that large class of thoughtful readers who may be expected to take an interest in *any* new movement in education; secondly, to con-

¹The Workingman's School and Free Kindergarten. The name Workingman's School is designed to indicate that the benefits of the institution are intended especially to accrue to the children of the working people, on the principle that those who are most sick need the physician most. By this is not meant, however, that the method of education by work should be confined to the children of the poor; on the contrary, it is important for the children of all classes, as will be sufficiently emphasized in what follows. The Workingman's School receives children from the Kindergarten at six and retains them until their fourteenth year. Thereafter the instruction is to be continued in a series of evening classes.

tribute to the spread of the principles here advocated ; thirdly, to evoke criticism in so far as there may be occasion for it.

The salient feature of the new experiment is that it introduces what may be called the *creative method* into school-education. The system of teaching by object-lessons has long been familiar to educators. It is proposed to improve upon this system by giving lessons in the *production* of objects. The step forward taken by Pestalozzi, when he summoned teachers to desist from the vain work of teaching the names of things, and to lead their pupils rather to a first-hand observation of things, marked a new epoch in the science of pedagogy. At present still another step must be taken, viz., from the mere observation to the production of things as a means of acquiring knowledge ; and the taking of this step will mark another epoch in pedagogy. Froebel began to apply the principle of the creative method in his kindergarten. But the kindergarten system covers only three years of the child's life, while for the school-age proper no valuable and tangible formulation of the creative principle has yet been given. Here the work remains to be done, and the experiment of which this article speaks is an attempt to do it.

I find it necessary, in this place, to mark the distinction between the creative method applied to education and what is commonly known as industrial education. A great deal of confusion is often caused and a vast amount of prejudice is needlessly aroused by the use of ambiguous terms, especially in designating new methods or ideas. The phrase 'industrial education' may have, and has acquired two entirely distinct meanings. As understood by one party, it means the kind of education that is intended to foster industrial skill and to fit the pupil, while at school, for the industrial pursuits of later life. Perhaps the majority of those who insist on the importance of industrial education in public schools, and who are urging its adoption use the phrase in this sense. And the strenuous opposition to industrial education on the part of many teachers is doubtless explicable by the same understanding of it. They declare with some vehemence, and, I firmly believe, with entire justice, that the State violates the rights of children when it undertakes to prescribe their future career dur-

ing the school-age, and that the public system of education should be kept free from any subserviency to "the bread and butter interests" of later life. But there is a totally different sense in which the phrase 'industrial education' may be understood: not that education shall be made subservient to industrial success, but that the acquisition of industrial skill shall be a means for promoting the general education of the pupil; that the education of the hand shall be a means of more completely and more efficaciously educating the brain. It is in the latter sense, in which labor is regarded as a means of mental development, that industrial education is understood by the most enlightened of its advocates. They are well aware that to introduce a trade into the school is to degrade the school; that to take away from the young the time that should be dedicated to the elements of general culture and devote it to training them in a special aptitude, however useful later on, is to impair the humanity of the children. They desire nothing of this sort, and they ask that a workshop be connected with every school, for no other reason than that a chemical laboratory is connected with every college.

There are thus two antagonistic parties whose watchword 'industrial education' has alike become. The one seeks to make the mass of mankind more machine-like than they already are, tho with the proviso that they shall be made more perfect machines, more skilful to increase wealth and to feed the channels of the manufacturer's profits. The other party, standing at the opposite pole of thought, seeks rather to elevate the masses, to more completely develop the humanity of the young, and looks upon technical and art education in the school as a novel and admirable means for achieving this result. Since, then, the phrase 'industrial education' is susceptible of interpretations so diverse and so incompatible with each other, it is in the interest at least of those who have the higher educational aim in view to make use of a less equivocal designation; and the phrase: 'the creative method' will henceforth be adopted by us.

Let me then endeavor to point out the application of the creative method in the school to the training of the intellect, to the development and refinement of the taste, to the formation of character. In respect to the training of the intellect, the

bearing of the creative method on the study of geometry will be especially obvious. The work on which the pupil is engaged in the school-workshop will make his conception of the fundamental geometrical relations unusually clear and distinct. The properties of a square, trapezoid, circle, ellipse, cube, cylinder, etc., will be more vividly realized by those who *embody* these forms than by those who only observe them. And if we remember that the geometrical forms are the key to the understanding of all forms whatsoever, we shall not underrate the importance of a perfect grasp of these forms by the youthful mind. At the end of this article will be found an outline of the scheme of lessons projected for the school-workshop. It will there be seen that the geometrical forms are produced by the pupils in different kinds of material and with a considerable variety of tools; and that the difficulties of the technical work and of the mathematical knowledge involved advance as far as possible in parallel lines. What Froebel began in the kindergarten is here carried out on a higher plane and with much greater minuteness of detail.

Secondly, in the school-workshop there is an intimate and constant connection between the drawing and the technical work. They are mutually complementary. The work is the concrete representation of the drawing, the drawing is the abstract representation of the work. It is well known how few workmen in the various trades are able to comprehend the abstract expression of form in a drawing so well as to translate it without the assistance of a model into the material at their command; or conversely, to represent a material form, if it be at all of a complicated character, in a correct drawing. But this faculty, which is of such inestimable advantage to the workman, and the lack of which is the subject of so many complaints, should be a part of the mental equipment of every well-educated person whether workman or not. No one can doubt that the language of form is one of those languages which every one should seek to master as being essential to the harmonious development of the mind; nor will it be gainsaid that the power of concretely expressing forms will give us a firmer mental hold upon the forms themselves.

Thirdly, the work of the pupils will aid them to a clearer un-

derstanding of the elementary facts of mechanics. The pupils will be taught to make parts of mechanism and will afterwards learn how these parts are put together. They will thus not only gain a more realizing knowledge of machines and their functions, but will also be led up to a better comprehension of the general laws and principles that underlie the action of machinery. Toward the end of the course they will be taught to cast in plaster of paris the most important parts of the steam-engine.

Fourthly, a series of workshop lessons has been specially prepared for the purpose of supporting and, as it were, supplying a foundation for the teaching of natural philosophy. The pupils will as far as possible construct their own scientific apparatus.

Parenthetically I would mention that the technical work of the pupils will be to them a gymnastic of the eye and hand. We hear much said concerning *mens sana in corpore sano* and concerning the importance of making every member of the body supple and pliable, every organ true and quick, so that the whole of our physical nature may be the ever ready and nimble servant of the soul. But how then does it come to pass that those two organs, the eye and the hand, which are the preferred messengers for carrying out the intentions of mind, should receive so little adequate discipline? To make good this deficiency, to secure a more perfect eye and hand training, and thus to carry forward the *gymnastic art* to its highest applications, the workshop in the school is needed. Who will deny that the future physician, the experimenter in every department of science, and indeed every one to whom a deft hand and keen powers of observation are important, will find such a preparatory discipline in early youth an inestimable advantage?

I have thus far spoken only of the value of the creative method for the culture of the intellect. But we who desire an "all-sided" rather than a one-sided development of the child must take into account the æsthetic and moral nature as well. Only by the harmonious culture of all three can the larger humanity be perfected, and the creative method must show itself capable of giving a powerful stimulus in all these different directions if it

would vindicate its title to the high significance which we are inclined to ascribe to it.

Now it is easy to see that the production of beautiful forms by the pupil will tend to heighten his appreciation of what is beautiful, and to refine his taste. I here speak of the school-atelier as I have before spoken of a school-workshop. Both are equally needed to supplement the class-rooms of the ordinary school. In the latter mechanical drawing is made the basis of instruction, and the work executed is the means of creating mathematical precision; in the former free-hand drawing is the basis, and the work done is the means of cultivating a sense of harmony and of beauty. Little children of eight years in our school-atelier are now learning to model leaves of various shapes, architectual ornaments, the features of the human face, and heads of animals; and it is wonderful to see with what delight they enter upon their work, how like a flood the instinct of creation, which is usually repressed and pent up in children, rushes forth as soon as an opportunity is given it to vent itself. The writer of this article can testify that children of the poorest class have displayed a liking and an aptitude for artistic production that seemed in the judgment of artists who saw their work truly remarkable. Let us consider what a promise is contained in this beginning; and what a benefit it would be if pupils in all schools could receive a similar education! How would art flourish anew if the slumbering art-instincts of the masses of the people were awakened, and a public sentiment were formed favorable to and appreciative of the highest efforts of true art! For it is idle to expect that great artists will be formed in this country, or in any country, by schools and advantages for the few. The solitary artist must perish or deteriorate for lack of the congenial atmosphere in which alone he can live. The great artist is the rich, ripe fruit of a whole people's art-life; is the high-crested wave that rises out of a whole sea of similar tendency and endowment. And not only would the public encouragement and understanding of the best art be fostered in school-ateliers, but the faculty of adequately executing the ideas of a sculptor or an architect would thus be trained. The complaint is made that we have not in this country workmen who, like those of France, can enter sympathetically into

the conception of an artist, feeling what he desires to express, and, in their subordinate capacity, contributing to the fine realization of his intentions. Can it excite surprise that this should be so, when we compare the pains which are taken with the art-education of the people generally in France and the all but neglect into which this branch of education is suffered to fall amongst ourselves? The creative method has here, too, a great mission of reform to fulfil; and a fairer future will dawn for art in America when its principles shall be understood and recognized.

Lastly, in this connection I shall have to dwell upon the influence of the creative method on the formation of character. The influence of the new method in education will be nothing short of revolutionary in this respect inasmuch as it will help to overthrow many of the impure conceptions of morality that prevail at the present day. The mass of mankind have not yet learned the immanent quality of virtue, and seek in extraneous motives the sanctions of moral conduct. The very question they ask—What is the good of performing a virtuous act?—shows how unsound and how unmoral their conceptions of virtue are. And the answer commonly given—For the sake of some reward or punishment, either here or hereafter—tends to confirm the same conclusion. What men need to learn is the intrinsic value of virtue; what they need to revere is the authority and majesty of laws inherent in the soul.

And now I would point out how the occupations of the workshop and the atelier combined tend to establish in the mind of the pupil an unselfish and impersonal standard of valuation which will prepare him admirably for the truer moral estimate of life. For days and perhaps for weeks he labors to convert a formless material into a form illustrating mathematical truth or æsthetic harmony. He undergoes protracted toil and meets perhaps with many failures and disappointments in order to be rewarded at last—by what? Simply by realizing in some degree that perfectness of the object which he aimed at from the beginning. His work is devoid of any pecuniary value. It is a mere typical form. Its worth consists in being true or in being beautiful. And a habit is thus formed of judging things in general according to their intrinsic rather than their superficial quali-

ties. Gradually, and almost insensibly, the analogy of the work performed on outward objects will be applied to inward experience. A delicate sensibility to true and harmonious relations will be engendered, and the impressions thus obtained can later on be raised into convictions by direct moral instruction. The pupil, when of sufficient age, can be taught that in the world of thought, and feeling too, truth and harmony of relation are the sole ends to be sought. He can be exhorted to undergo similar toil, to be prepared for similar failures and disappointments, in order to realize at last something of the same inward perfection which is to be his only and all-sufficient reward. Thus while he is shaping the typical objects which the instructor proposes to him as a task, while he pores silently, persistently, and lovingly over these objects, reaching success by dint of gradual approximation, he is, at the same time, shaping his own character, and a tendency of mind is created from which will eventually result the loftiest and purest morality.¹

There are other incidental moral influences implied in the creative method. It leads to comradeship among the little workers. It allows of union of effort in the performance of those common tasks which are occasionally proposed to a whole class, when all the pupils combine to produce a common result and are alike interested in it because they have all contributed to its achievement. It leads to a willing recognition of superior merit in fellow-workers, and a subordination of the less to the guidance of the more efficient. This indispensable element of a generous character, in which the generality of workmen are so sadly deficient, is inculcated by the appointment of the abler pupils of a class to be the helpers, the foremen as it were, of the less able.

Having thus passed in review some of the principal advantages which the system of education by production carries with it, it will be readily perceived that they are calculated to accrue to the children of the rich as well as the poor, to those who will

¹ It may be objected that the pursuit of the beautiful does not always, as experience shows, react favorably on the character. But it must be answered that this is true only of a one-sided development in the direction of art; while in the school the severe discipline of the workshop is combined with the refining influence of the study and the creation of the beautiful.

later in life enter the professions as well as those who are destined for a trade, to those who will be merchants and scholars as well as those who will be compelled to do the hard physical labor of the world. But for the class last mentioned certain additional advantages will result from the method we have described; and a few words concerning these may not be amiss. I count among the peculiar benefits which the working class will reap from the introduction of the creative method into schools, first, the circumstance that, becoming possessed of superior skill, they will turn out superior work; that they will enhance the value of their country's manufactures in the great markets of competition, and will secure a larger share of the general wealth for themselves. But this pecuniary benefit, important as it is to the wage-earning class, we distinctly refuse to recognize as the chief aim and end of work-education, and we regard it as insignificant compared with a higher mental and moral good which superior training will place within reach of the future workmen. The worker in the factory at the present day too often moves like a machine among machines. He does not comprehend the wonderful processes which occur around him, and his mind is blunted and degraded by constant contact with operations of whose principles he is ignorant. Far otherwise would it be if he could be so far educated as to understand the nature of the material with which he deals, the laws which the gigantic forces that he utilizes obey; and if the mechanical contrivances amongst which he labors would become transparent to his eyes so as to reveal their underlying plan. The worker becomes truly independent then when he has intellectually mastered his work. And it is one of the fairest promises of the creative method that it will ultimately help to build up such intelligence, that it will give a new dignity to labor by putting more mind into it, and that it will saturate the daily toil of the masses of mankind with understanding. Thereafter, when independence shall have been achieved in one direction, it will be less difficult to achieve it in others as well; thereafter experiments looking to the more equal distribution of society's wealth will have some chance of success; higher and juster forms of social life will not appear so hopelessly out of reach as they do now, and the individuals who must form the constituent factors of the new society will be prepared

and disciplined by intelligence and the practice of self-restraint to enter into a better order.

The leading features of the creative method have thus been delineated, and it only remains to add a number of minor points whose importance will be especially apparent to professional teachers.¹ The creative method will open a new avenue for exploring the individuality of the pupil. It will offer a new opportunity for the nature of the child to declare itself and to reveal its bias. The progress of all modern education is in the direction of greater individualization, and wise pedagogues will welcome any new test of individuality as an invaluable help.

The creative method affords a wholesome alternation between work and study, and thus provides an additional means of mental and bodily recreation. Change of occupation is often better than entire rest. When pupils shall pass from the class-room to the workshop or atelier, and from these back to the class-room, they will experience a new zest and relish for their school duties, and every faculty will become brighter and keener. It is a noteworthy fact that in England the results achieved in the half-time schools, which are attended by factory children, are on an average as high as in the ordinary day-schools. The work of the factory tends to quicken the observation, to concentrate the attention, and to stimulate the mental activity of those children, so that they learn in half time what others learn in full time. This experience may well serve to refute a persistent objection which the opponents of improved methods of education are in the habit of urging; namely, that the young are already sufficiently burdened, and that it would be injurious to impose new loads upon their already overtaxed brains. The system of education by work will have no such tendency; on the contrary, the exercise of their creative instinct will be a genuine refreshment for the

¹ It should be noted that not all the pupils of the school are required to go through the entire course of technical and art instruction which has been marked out. Those who, after a prolonged trial, show themselves to be hopelessly incapacitated in either direction are dropped from the course, and the main stress of their education is laid on other studies. In our own experience, tho we are dealing with the poorest class, the list of incapable pupils, as compared with the total number, is small.

young, and instead of imposing an additional load we shall in reality make all their other studies easier by the salutary influence which variety of occupation cannot fail to exert.

Furthermore, the creative method often affords us the means of rescuing an intellectual life that seems already past redemption. It is necessary to the mental health of adults, and deeply important in the education of children, that they should be able to do some one thing thoroughly well. The being able to do one thing well is the starting-point for doing other things well. Now it happens not infrequently that children, and especially those whose memory is weak, fall hopelessly behindhand in the ordinary branches of a public-school course. In consequence they are set down as dunces, and hearing this opinion constantly repeated by others, they gradually adopt it themselves, settle down to the conviction of their stupidity, and fall into a dull, brooding condition from which they may never emerge. Cases of such children have occurred in the Workingman's School. But what a change was observed in these very children when they were taken into the school-workshop! They happened to be exceptionally endowed with manual skill: in the workshop they easily performed the tasks set them, and even excelled their fellow-pupils. As a consequence their crushed self-respect re-rose, their attitude became manlier, their look more confident, they had done one thing well; and this gave a favorable turn to their whole development, and a new impulse to their exertions in every direction. It is assuredly no slight argument in favor of the creative method that it affords us a means of building up the self-respect of children who are mentally backward, and thus furnishes a point where the lever may be applied in order to raise their entire intellectual status.

In conclusion it should be said that the reflex influence of the creative method is felt even in those branches in which its direct application is impossible. There are many objects of knowledge which children cannot reproduce. But they can be taught to represent the objects which they cannot make, and they may even be led to enact at least the simpler events of history dramatically in the class-room. This indeed is, in a word, the meaning of the forward movement in education which we advocate; namely, that whatever the subject taught may be, the appeal

should be to the spontaneity of the pupils, and that their relation to the objects of knowledge should be as far as possible active, not merely contemplative.

The purpose of the creative method is to build up a more complete humanity in the young. The total humanity of the child is the ideal aim; and in the interest of no base or mercenary end, but of this highest spiritual purpose, the school workshop and atelier are demanded. Over their portals should be inscribed: "Sacred to the larger Humanity."¹

FELIX ADLER.

¹ It may be proper to add that in the school whose method we have described, seeing that the total humanity of the children is the aim, we have found it necessary to extend our influence beyond the school into the homes. A close connection between the parents and the teachers of the school has been established. Every month a so-called Parents' Meeting takes place at which the progress or deficiencies of the pupils are brought to the notice of their parents. At these meetings, moreover, some special features of the method of the school are always discussed, so that the parents may gain an insight into our plans and give us their assistance in carrying them out. The result has thus far been most satisfactory. The parents have, of their own accord, organized a committee to support the managers of the school, and a feeling of mutual confidence and good-will prevails.

A second measure was found necessary to facilitate the working of the system. In teaching natural history it became evident that many of our pupils, taken as they were from the tenement-houses of New York, did not possess those elementary impressions of nature upon which, as a foundation, the instructor must build. We arranged, therefore, to send out a vacation-colony into some picturesque district of country, and selected the little town of Sherman, in Pennsylvania, for this purpose. Thither, for several years in succession, almost the entire school has gone in charge of the principal. And there in the woods, and among the hills, and along the streams, they have gained not only new health and vigor, but also that more vivid realization of natural objects which will contribute greatly to enhance the value of their winter's study.

The chief practical difficulty in carrying out the plan of the school was found to consist in formulating a series of workshop lessons whose value should be educational. Numerous attempts at so-called industrial education have been made, both in this country and abroad, but to our knowledge they are for the most part aimless, incoherent, and lacking in system. There are thousands of manual occupations from which a selection must be made, and of these, now one kind, then another, has been chosen for introduction into the school (printing, carpentry, basket-making, and the like), without much rhyme or reason in the choice. What is needed is a principle of selection which shall organically connect the work-instruction with the remaining branches. It seemed to the writer that such a principle of selection might be found in the drawing course in both its de-

partments: mechanical drawing to be the basis of instruction in the workshop, and free-hand drawing the basis of work in the atelier. In the department of art-instruction the realization of this idea seems comparatively easy; in the department of technical instruction the difficulty is much greater. An attempt to solve it has however been made, and the following outline will afford the reader a survey of the scheme of workshop lessons projected for and partly carried out in the school. The board of managers of the school are not committed to all the details of the plan, which will continue to be modified as the experiment proceeds. But the scheme will show at least the lines along which we hope to advance toward our goal.

The following is submitted as a plan of co-operative drawing and work instruction for the eight classes of the workingman's school:

This plan consists of a series of exercises so arranged that the different tools and materials of construction employed are successively introduced according to the ages and abilities of the pupils, so that the actual practice necessary for the skilful manipulation of the tools may be given simultaneously with an education of the mind.

The exercises planned for the five lowest classes involve the rudiments and most important principles of geometry, and also introduce such study of mathematics found to be necessary for making measurements and for the calculation of areas and volumes.

For the latter part of the course exercises have been arranged in which the pupil will make drawings and construct the apparatus necessary for making simple experiments illustrating the elementary principles and most useful laws of mechanics and physics. Throughout the scheme the exercises in the work-instruction course will be constructed from the pupil's own drawings. By this means the work of both the drawing and the work-instruction departments will be pursued at a greater advantage than they would be if entirely independent of each other; but besides this, the pupil will be taught to appreciate the true relation between the plan and the construction. The habit of working from a definite plan will be inculcated, which will be of great value and an important factor to the pupil's success in whatever he may undertake later in life.

To illustrate definitely the connection that exists between the drawing and the work-instruction courses, an example of an exercise designed for the fourth class is taken. In the drawing-room the pupil will be given a model of a cone from which he will take measurements and then make a complete working drawing. In the workshop, with the drawing, proper material, and tools, the pupil will turn in his lathe a cone according to his drawing, which when completed will be a copy of the original model used in the drawing-room.

The following is a very brief summary of the plan for each class:

The exercises planned for the eighth and seventh classes introduce the use of paper, pencils, triangles, compasses, and rulers in the drawing-room. In the work-room small toy squares and chisels are employed for carving geometrical forms from pieces of clay. Only plane figures are involved in the exercise for the eighth and seventh classes, from which the pupil will acquire a knowledge of the names and properties of lines, angles, polygons, circles, parts of the circle, and also the methods of construction of many geometrical forms.

In order that the exercises may have greater interest to the pupil than could

be elicited from the study of abstract geometrical figures, the pupil will first be shown a model of some familiar object composed of pieces representing different geometrical forms. For example, a model of a house will be taken at first, and then the different geometrical figures, as the square, the rectangle, and the triangle, which enter into the structure of the model will be taken as the subjects of different exercises.

The exercises designed for the sixth class introduce the use of the drawing-board and "T-square." In the work-instruction course the knife is employed in cutting the developments of geometrical solids from pasteboard. By means of the exercises arranged for this class the pupil will be given a conception of the relation between the development and the finished solid, and will also acquire a more thorough knowledge of the properties of the plane figures which have been subjects of exercises during the two preceding years.

The exercises arranged for the fifth class introduce the use of the hand-bracket or scroll saw in the workshop.

In connection with the exercises, methods will be given for calculating the area of different plane figures and for the construction of ovals and ellipses.

The exercises planned for the fourth class introduce in the drawing-course the drawing of solids, and in the workshop a series of parallel exercises in which the hand-saw is introduced and practice given in wood-turning. The aim of the exercises prepared for this class is to teach the methods of draughting solid bodies, and methods for calculating the volumes of many of the solids which are subjects of the exercises.

In the exercises arranged for the third class the drawing of objects composed of several parts is introduced. In the workshop a carpentry course will be taken up in which a large part of the apparatus used for the experiments in mechanics and physics will be constructed. By the construction of different types of joints used in framing, and applying them in the simple form of bridge or roof truss, the pupil will be taught the form that should be given joints, to illustrate special varieties of strain.

The exercises planned for the second class introduce drawing, from "free-hand sketches," parts of the machinery used in the shop. In the workshop a series of exercises will be given in moulding, in which a general knowledge of the principles of moulding will be taught. The moulds will be set up as they would be in any iron-foundry, but, as a substitute for molten iron, liquid plaster of Paris will be poured in casting. Many of the patterns used in making the moulds will be the results of preceding exercises.

The exercises designed for the first class give a continuation of drawing parts and combinations of parts of machinery used in the shop. In the workshop practice will be given in the chipping and filing of metals and the hand-turning of brass. Many of the exercises in drawing will be the representation of parts of the steam-engine; and as a culminating exercise in the shop the pupil will construct a small and simple form of steam-engine. In connection with this last exercise the pupil will become familiar with the operations and functions of the parts of a steam-engine.

The exercises intended to illustrate many elementary principles and laws of mechanics and physics have been chosen so that the pupil, with the knowledge of the use of tools acquired in the workshop, will be able to construct most of the

apparatus necessary for the experiments, as well as to afford him the opportunity of taking part in their performance.

In mechanics experiments will be made illustrating the action of force, inertia, gravity, laws of the pendulum, laws of falling bodies, moments, centrifugal force, etc.

In physics a number of exercises have been planned to illustrate the most important facts with regard to hydrostatics, hydraulics, pneumatics, sound, light, heat, and electricity.

In order to give an idea of the plan to be adopted with reference to the experimental exercises an example is taken in which the reflection of sound will be illustrated by experiment. In the workshop the pupil will construct from his drawing a simple apparatus consisting of a stand carrying two pulleys, one of which is much smaller than the other and can be rotated with considerable velocity by turning the larger wheel, which communicates its motion to the smaller one by means of an endless cord extending around the circumferences of both. A disc of card-board with two sectors cut out of it on opposite sides of the centre will be attached to the axis of the smaller wheel. A toy-trumpet held near the revolving disc will be used to produce the sound, which to a listener will seem to increase and diminish in power as it is alternately shut off and reflected or is allowed to pass through one of the apertures.

The foregoing is a general outline of the detailed plan which is submitted as provisional, and will be modified at any time as experience may dictate to be necessary for the fulfilment of its object.

ST. PAUL.

THAT the apostle Paul was one of the greatest men, if not the greatest, in the spiritual history of our race is universally admitted. "Should any one ask me," said a distinguished French orator (Adolphe Monod), "to name the man who, of all others, has been the greatest benefactor of our race, I should say without hesitation, the apostle Paul. His name is the type of human activity the most endless, and at the same time the most useful that history has cared to preserve." Another Frenchman (Dr. Godet) calls him "a unique man for a unique work." Even Renan, who has no sympathy whatever with Paul's doctrines and inner life, and cannot understand them, yet feels constrained to do homage to the lofty intellect and the noble heart of him whom he designates as the apostle of marching and conquering Christianity ("*le christianisme conquérant et voyageur*"). Baur and the Tübingen school of radical critics almost make Paul rather than Jesus of Nazareth the founder of Christianity as a system of free and universal salvation.

Paul's career was that of a moral hero and conqueror of souls for Christ, far less brilliant indeed, but infinitely more noble, beneficial, and enduring, than that of military conquerors prompted by ambition, sacrificing millions of treasure and myriads of lives, to die at last in a drunken fit at Babylon, or of a broken heart on the lonely rocks of St. Helena. Their empires have long since crumbled into dust, but St. Paul still remains the great moral teacher of victorious faith, of Christian freedom and progress; and the pulses of his mighty heart are beating even with greater force now than ever before throughout the civilized world. His Epistles are to this day, as they have been for eighteen centuries, a mine of wisdom and comfort, an inspira-

tion to great thoughts and deeds, a Magna Charta of freedom from bondage, a lever of reform in countries and languages of which he never heard.

Paul had the natural outfit for his great work. He combined Semitic fervor, Greek versatility, and Roman energy. A Hebrew of the Hebrews of the school of Gamaliel, a Hellenist of Tarsus and master of the Greek tongue, and a Roman citizen by birth, he was better qualified than any other apostle to proclaim, expound, and defend the Christian religion as a power of universal salvation for Jew and Gentile on condition of a living faith.

But his great talents were at first weapons of destruction. He was an architect of ruin before he became an architect of the temple of God. Educated in the strictest school of the Pharisees, he regarded Jesus of Nazareth as a dangerous innovator, as a false Messiah and seducer of the people who was justly put to death. He placed himself at the head of persecution which broke out after the bold speech of Stephen, the protomartyr, and determined to stamp out this dangerous sect, thinking thereby to promote the glory of God and the honor of his ancestral religion. After scattering the congregation of Jerusalem, he proceeded with full authority from the Sanhedrin to Damascus to bring the fugitive Christians back to Jerusalem in chains. But the height of his fanatical opposition was the beginning of his devotion to Christianity.

That event at Damascus marks an epoch not only in the history of Paul and the apostolic church, but also in the history of mankind. The sudden and radical transformation of the most dangerous persecutor into the most successful promoter of Christianity is nothing less than a miracle of divine grace which rests on the greater miracle of the resurrection of Christ. Both are inseparably connected; without the resurrection the conversion would have been impossible, and on the other hand the conversion of Paul is one of the best proofs of the resurrection of Christ. Both stand or fall together.

Attempts have been made, as in the case of the resurrection of Christ,¹ to explain the conversion of Paul from purely natu-

¹ Compare an article on that subject in the *PRINCETON REVIEW* for May, 1880.

ral causes without a miracle, but they have failed. Let us briefly examine them.

1. The old rationalistic theory of thunder and lightning, which has been abandoned in Germany, but recently revived and rhetorically embellished by Renan (in his "*Les apôtres*," ch. x. pp. 175, *sqq.*), attributes the conversion to physical causes; namely, a violent storm and the delirium of a burning Syrian fever in which Paul superstitiously mistook the thunder for the voice of God, and the lightning for a heavenly vision. But the record says nothing about thunder-storm and fever, and both combined could not produce such an effect upon any sensible man, much less upon the history of the world. Who ever heard the thunder speak in Hebrew or in any other articulate language? And had not Paul and Luke eyes and ears and common-sense, as well as we, to distinguish between an ordinary phenomenon of nature from a supernatural vision?

2. The vision-hypothesis resolves the conversion into a natural psychological process and into an honest self-delusion of Paul; as the resurrection of Christ is supposed to have been a sweet dream of the apostles. This is the favorite theory of the modern rationalists of the Tübingen and Leyden schools and their followers in England. Dr. Baur and Strauss started it, and Holsten, Lipsius, Pfleiderer, Hausrath, and the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" adopted and defended it. Holsten is its chief expounder and advocate, in his "*Christusvision des Paulus*." The theory is undoubtedly more rational than the thunder-and-lightning theory, because it ascribes a mighty moral change to intellectual and moral rather than physical and accidental causes. It assumes that a great fermentation was going on in the mind of Paul on his way to Damascus which resulted at last by logical necessity in an entire change of conviction and conduct, without any supernatural influence, the very possibility of which is denied by this school as a breach in the continuity of historical development. The miracle in this case was simply the symbolical reflection of the commanding presence of Jesus in the thoughts of Paul; in other words, a delusion.

It is incredible that a man of such a sound, clear, and strong mind as that of Paul undoubtedly was, should have made such a radical and far-reaching blunder as to confound subjective reflec-

tions with an objective appearance of Jesus whom he persecuted, and to ascribe solely to an act of divine mercy what he must have known to be the result of his own thoughts, if he thought at all.

The advocates of this theory throw the appearances of the risen Lord to the older disciples, the later visions of Peter, Philip, and John in the Apocalypse, into the same category of subjective illusions in the high tide of nervous excitement and religious enthusiasm. It is plausibly maintained that Paul was an enthusiast, fond of visions and revelations, and that he justifies a doubt concerning the reality of the resurrection itself by putting all the appearances of the risen Christ on the same level with his own, altho several years elapsed between those of Jerusalem and Galilee, and that on the way to Damascus.

But this, the only possible argument for the vision-hypothesis, is entirely untenable. When Paul says, "*Last* of all, as unto an *untimely* offspring, Christ appeared to me also," he draws a clear line of distinction between the *personal* appearances of Christ and his own later visions, and closes the former with the one vouchsafed to him at his conversion. Once, and once only, he claims to have seen the Lord in visible form, and to have heard his voice; last, indeed, and out of due time, yet as truly and really as the other apostles. He uses the *realness* of Christ's resurrection as a basis of his wonderful discussion of the future resurrection of believers, which would lose all its force if Christ was not actually raised from the dead.

Moreover, his conversion coincided with his call to the apostleship. If the former was a delusion, the latter must have been a delusion. He emphasizes his direct call to the apostleship of the Gentiles by the personal appearance of Christ without any human intervention, in opposition to his Judaizing adversaries who tried to undermine his labors. (Gal. i. 1-18).

The whole assumption of a long inward preparation, both intellectual and moral, for a change is without any evidence, and cannot set aside the fact that Paul was, according to his repeated confession, at that time violently persecuting Christianity in its followers. His conversion can be far less explained from antecedent causes, surrounding circumstances, and personal motives than that of any other disciple. While

the older apostles were devoted friends of Jesus, Paul was his enemy, bent at the very time of the great change on an errand of cruel persecution, and therefore in a state of mind most unlikely to give birth to a vision so fatal to his present object and his future career. How could a fanatical persecutor of Christianity, "breathing threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord," stultify and contradict himself by an imaginative conceit which tended to the building up of that very religion which he was laboring to destroy?

But supposing, with Renan, that his mind was temporarily upset in the delirium of feverish excitement, he certainly soon recovered health and reason, and had every opportunity to correct his error: he was intimate with the murderers of Jesus, who could have produced tangible evidence against the resurrection if it had never occurred; and after a long pause of quiet reflection he went to Jerusalem, spent a fortnight with Peter, and learned from him and from James the brother of Christ their experiences and compared them with his own. Everything in this case is against the mythical and legendary theory which requires a change of environment and the lapse of years for the formation of poetic fancies and fictions.

Finally, the whole life-work of Paul from his conversion at Damascus to his martyrdom in Rome is the best possible argument against this hypothesis and for the reality of his conversion as an act of divine grace. "By their fruits ye shall know them." How could such an effective change proceed from an empty dream? Can an illusion change the current of history? By joining the Christian sect Paul sacrificed everything, at last life itself, to the service of Christ. He never wavered in his conviction of the truth as revealed to him, and by his faith in this revelation he has become a benediction to all ages.

The vision-hypothesis denies objective miracles, but ascribes miracles to subjective imaginations, and makes a lie more effective and beneficial than the truth.

It is evident, therefore, that the rationalistic and natural interpretations of the conversion of Paul turn out to be irrational and unnatural; the supernatural interpretation of Paul himself after all is the most rational and natural.

And to this conclusion honest doubt has been driven at last

in its ablest representatives. Dr. Baur, the master-spirit of sceptical criticism and the founder of the "Tübingen school," felt constrained, shortly before his death (1860), to abandon the vision-hypothesis and to admit that "no psychological or dialectical analysis can explore the inner mystery of the act in which God revealed his son in Paul" (*keine, weder psychologische noch dialektische Analyse kann das innere Geheimniss des Actes erforschen, in welchem Gott seinen Sohn in ihm enthüllte*). In the same connection he says that in "the sudden transformation of Paul from the most violent adversary of Christianity into its most determined herald" he could see "nothing short of a miracle" (*Wunder*); and adds that "this miracle appears all the greater when we remember that in this revulsion of his consciousness he broke through the barriers of Judaism and rose out of its particularism into the universalism of Christianity." This frank confession is creditable to the head and heart of the late Tübingen critic, but is fatal to his whole anti-supernaturalistic theory of history. *Si falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. If we admit the miracle in one case, the door is opened for all other miracles which rest on equally strong evidence.

Dr. Keim (d. 1879), an independent pupil of Baur, who in his "Life of Jesus" even went beyond Baur on the Johannean question, admits at least *spiritual* manifestations of the ascended Christ *from heaven*, and urges in favor of the objective reality of the Christophany of Paul, as related by him 1 Cor. xv. 3, *sqq.*: "The whole character of Paul; his sharp understanding, which was not weakened by his enthusiasm; the careful, cautious, measured, simple form of his statement; above all, the favorable total impression of his narrative and the mighty echo of it in the unanimous, uncontradicted faith of primitive Christendom."

Prof. Reuss, of Strassburg, likewise an independent critic of the liberal school, in his recent Commentary on the Pauline Epistles (1878), came to a similar conclusion; namely, that the conversion of Paul, if not an absolute miracle, is at least an unsolved psychological problem. "*La conversion de Paul*," he says, "*après tout ce qui en été dit de notre temps, reste toujours, si ce n'est un miracle absolu, dans lesens traditionnel de ce mot, du moins un problème psychologique aujourd'hui insoluble. L'explication dite naturelle, qu'elle fasse intervenir un orage ou qu'elle se retranche dans le do-*

maine de hallucinations . . . ne nous donne pas la clef de cette crise elle-même qui a décidé la métamorphose du pharisien en chrétien."

The conversion of Paul changed his character and course of life, without destroying his identity. The connecting link between Saul the Jew and Paul the Christian was the honest and earnest pursuit of righteousness, or conformity to the holy will of God. First he sought it through works of the law and failed, then he sought and found it through faith in Christ who died and rose for him; and this faith became the most powerful stimulus to holiness. Hereafter he was identified with Christ, and love to Christ was his only passion. The engine was reversed and its direction changed, but it was the same engine, only purged, improved, and intensified in energy. The weapons of destruction became weapons of construction. He remained the same fearless, martial, and heroic nature, but under the banner of the cross against the enemies of the cross. The same vigor, depth, and acuteness of mind, but illuminated by the Holy Spirit; the same imperious temper and burning zeal, but subdued and controlled by wisdom and moderation; the same energy, boldness, and independence, but coupled with gentleness and meekness; and added to all this, as crowning graces, a love and humility, a tenderness and delicacy of feeling, almost without a parallel in the history of saints. The little Epistle to Philemon reveals a perfect Christian gentleman, a nobleman of nature, doubly ennobled by grace; and the seraphic description of charity in the first Epistle to the Corinthians surpasses in beauty anything that has ever been said and written on the same subject. It alone is a sufficient proof of his inspiration.

The work of Paul was twofold—practical and theoretical. We can only glance at it and present it in its general outline. He was the greatest missionary and the profoundest theologian among the apostles. He preached the gospel of free and universal grace from Damascus to Rome, and secured its triumph in the Roman Empire, which means the civilized world of that age. At the same time he built up the church from within by the exposition and defence of the gospel in his Epistles. He descended to the humblest details of ecclesiastical administration and discipline, and mounted to the sublimest heights of theological speculation.

His inspiring motive was love to Christ and to his fellow-men. "The love of Christ," he says, "constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died: and he died for all that they who live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." He regarded himself as a bondman and ambassador of Christ, entreating men to be reconciled to God. Animated by this spirit, he became "as a Jew to the Jews, as a Gentile to the Gentiles, all things to all men, that by all means he might save some."

He made Antioch, the capital of Syria and the mother-church of Gentile Christendom, his point of departure for and return from his missionary journeys, and at the same time he kept up his connection with Jerusalem, the mother-church of Jewish Christendom. Altho an independent apostle of Christ, he accepted a solemn commission from Antioch for his first great missionary tour. He followed the westward current of history, commerce, and civilization from Asia to Europe, from Syria to Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, and perhaps as far as Spain and Gaul; and had America been discovered earlier he might have crossed the ocean and preached to the native Indians. As it was, he came, as Clement of Rome says, "to the extreme boundary of the West." In the larger and more influential cities—Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Rome—he resided a considerable time. From these salient points he sent the Gospel by his pupils and fellow-laborers into the surrounding towns and villages. But he always avoided collision with other apostles, and sought new fields of labor where Christ was not known before, that he might not build on any other man's foundation. This is true independence and missionary courtesy, which is so often, alas! violated by missionary societies inspired by sectarian rather than Christian zeal.

His chief mission was to the Gentiles, without excluding the Jews, according to the message of Christ delivered through Ananias: "Thou shalt bear my name before the Gentiles and kings, and the children of Israel." Considering that the Jews had a prior claim in time to the Gospel ("to the Jews *first*," Rom. i. 16), and that the synagogues in heathen cities were pioneer stations for Christian missions, he very naturally ad-

dressed himself first to the Jews and proselytes, taking up the regular lessons of the Old Testament Scriptures, and demonstrating their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth. But almost uniformly he found the half-Jews, or "proselytes of the gate," more open to the Gospel than his own brethren; they were honest and earnest seekers of the true religion, and formed the natural bridge to the pure heathen and the nucleus of his congregations, which were generally composed of converts from both religions.

In noble self-denial he earned his subsistence with his own hands, as a tent-maker, that he might not be burdensome to his congregations (mostly belonging to the lower classes), that he might preserve his independence, stop the mouths of his enemies, and testify his gratitude to the infinite mercy of the Lord, who had called him from his headlong, fanatical career of persecution to the office of an apostle of free grace. He never collected money for himself, but for the poor Jewish Christians in Palestine. Only as an exception did he receive gifts from his converts at Philippi, who were peculiarly dear to him. Yet he repeatedly enjoins upon the churches to care for the liberal temporal support of their teachers who break to them the bread of eternal life.

Of the innumerable difficulties, dangers, and sufferings which he encountered with Jews, heathens, and false brethren we can hardly form an adequate idea; for the book of Acts is only a summary record. He supplements it incidentally. "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Three times was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, three times I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep; in journeyings often, in perils of rivers, in perils of robbers, in perils from my countrymen, in perils from the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in labor and toil, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness. Beside those things that are without, there is that which presseth upon me daily, the anxious care for all the churches. Who is weak, and I am not weak? who is offended, and I burn not?" Thus he wrote reluctantly to the Corinthians, in self-vindication against his calumniators, in the year 57, before his longest and hardest trial in the prisons of Cæsarea and Rome, and at least

seven years before his martyrdom. He was "pressed on every side, yet not straitened; perplexed, yet not in despair; pursued, yet not forsaken; smitten down, yet not destroyed." His whole public career was a continuous warfare. He represents the church militant or "marching and conquering Christianity." He was *unus versus mundum* in a far higher sense than this has been said of Athanasius the Great when confronted with the Arian heresy and the imperial heathenism of Julian the Apostate. But in all his conflicts with foes from without and from within, Paul was "more than conqueror" through the grace of God, which was sufficient for him. "For I am persuaded," he writes to the Romans, in the strain of a sublime ode of triumph, "that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." And his dying word is an assurance of victory: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous, shall give me at that day; and not to me only, but unto all them that love his appearing."

The life and labors of such a man furnish the best possible evidence of Christianity, next to the character of Christ himself, who alone was free from sin and imperfection. Paul nowhere claims perfection. He no doubt had a violent temper, which he did not always sufficiently control. He may have handled good old Peter too severely when he called him a hypocrite in the face of the congregation at Antioch for a sin of weakness and temporary inconsistency. He may have been too rigorous when he separated from his old friend and companion, Barnabas, on account of his cousin Mark, whom he refused to take along on his second missionary journey because he had become homesick on the first and returned to his mother in Jerusalem. But Paul grew in humility as he advanced in life. First, in 57, he thought he was "the least of the apostles and not meet to be an apostle"; five years later, in the prison at Rome, he spoke of himself as "the least of all saints;" and two years afterwards, writing to his beloved disciple Timothy, he called himself "the

chief of sinners." The voice of history adds: "and the chief of saints."

The value of his Epistles to the facts of the gospel history is incalculable. At least four of them, and they by far the most important—namely, the Romans, First and Second Corinthians, and the Galatians—are accepted as genuine by the most exacting of the modern critics. Hilgenfeld, Pfleiderer, and Lipsius—all of the Tübingen school—admit seven, adding First Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon. Renan goes still further and concedes also Second Thessalonians and Colossians to be genuine, thus swelling the number of Pauline Epistles to nine. The Ephesians will soon be surrendered, and the three pastoral Epistles alone will remain more or less doubtful among scholars until the second Roman captivity can be more fully established; for it is almost impossible to locate them at any period before the first Roman captivity, with which the Acts conclude. Yet even in these Epistles the evidence of their Pauline origin greatly preponderates over the difficulties and objections which have been raised by Schleiermacher, Baur, and Holtzmann.

But even if we confine ourselves to the four great Epistles which Baur acknowledged and made the very basis of his attacks on the credibility of the Acts, they are sufficient to establish all the prominent facts of the life of Christ as well known and generally believed among the Christians at the time when those Epistles were composed: *i.e.*, between A.D. 54 to 58, within less than thirty years after the crucifixion. They refer to our Lord's birth from a woman of the royal house of David, his sinless life and perfect example, his atoning death, his triumphant resurrection on the third day, his repeated manifestations to his disciples, his ascension and exaltation to the right hand of God, whence he will return to judge all men in righteousness; the adoration of Christ by his followers, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and establishment of the church in Jerusalem, the martyrdom of Stephen, the conversion and calling of Paul by the appearance of Christ to him at Damascus, the rapid spread of Christianity from Jerusalem to Rome and all intervening places of importance, the council at Jerusalem, the controversy about circumcision and the law, the celebration of baptism, and

the Lord's Supper in commemoration of the Lord's dying love for sinners. He alludes most frequently to the crucifixion and the resurrection of Christ as the two most important events by which our redemption was accomplished and our victory over sin and death is divinely secured. It is unnecessary to quote passages which the reader can easily find on every page of those Epistles. All the Pauline and other Epistles of the New Testament are brimful of Christ, and are absolutely inconceivable without the historic foundation of his divine-human life and work on earth, which was to Paul, as it is still to all true Christians, the most certain as well as the most important and sacred fact in the history of mankind.

PHILIP SCHAFF.

THE HIDDEN HEART.

THE word Heart, the words nearly synonymous with it or closely related to it, the kindred forms of expression, the One Great idea and the subordinate ideas suggested by them, occupy a large place in the Scriptural language and the Scriptural thought. It is the purpose of the present paper to attempt an exploration of this rich field. In so doing, the following words of Christ may be taken as the key-text, the starting-point and the returning-goal of the whole discussion: "The good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things; but the evil man, out of the evil treasure of the heart, bringeth forth evil things" (Luke vi. 45). There is no assumption here of philosophical or psychological language. It is a very common saying that the Bible was not given to teach us science—natural science or physiology. Its anatomy is not to be taken as exclusively correct, or binding upon us. So, also, is it maintained, and in a certain sense most correctly, that we must not expect to find in the Scriptures a system of mental philosophy. The remark, however, is often used to denote something different from this, as tho it were in vain to search these divine writings for any aid in discovering the deeper or more interior truths of man's nature. The Bible was given for practical purposes; so is it often and most truly said; it was intended for the guidance of plain minds in the plain duties of life and religion; we must not expect to learn psychology from it. Now it is certainly correct to say that the Scriptures are not philosophical in the ordinary sense of that term. They are not a *γνῶσις*, "a knowledge" or gnostical scheme affecting either a philosophical height or philosophical profundity. They are not esoteric, that is, for the initiated few. Such a style would be unworthy of truth that comes down to us from

Heaven and out of the Infinite Love. In respect to the great ideas of revelation, we are all so much on a par that any language adapted to a certain class of minds would be a mockery of humanity. It would come no nearer to truth in one direction; it would have every appearance of falsity and one-sidedness on the other.

Still may it be maintained that there is in this simple language of the Saviour, and in this plain imagery of the Scriptures, the sounding of a depth in human nature to which no mere treatise on psychology or anthropology has ever penetrated. Our *a priori* or rational psychology may give us the outline of the spiritual structure; it may fix for us, with more or less exactness, and in its own language, the location of this inner chamber which the Scriptures style "the heart" or "the treasure-house of the heart;" but it fails to explore its actual moral or spiritual contents. Our empirical psychology, on the other hand, and our empirical ethics, may trace *effects* or things as "*they come out*" in experience. None but a Divine knowledge and a Divine revelation, either inward or outward, can discover to us the deep fountain of *these outgoings*, or the true condition of the primal source from which they flow.

There is a department of the human soul which Christ calls "the treasure" or "the treasure-house." It is the strong vault of the spirit far down below the outward word and act, below the thoughts in any objective shape they may assume to our thinking consciousness. Yes, below the thoughts, we say, for they are born in it and come *up out of it*. "*Out of the heart come forth evil thoughts.*" "The imagination of the thoughts of the heart are evil, and evil continually." It is below the emotions even, which lie lower down than the thoughts. It is deeper than any motus, movement, or acting of the soul, unless we mean that static action, force, or life which is involved in its very spiritual status or constitution; since all life, all being in fact, is inseparable from the idea of a doing or an energy in some form. It is thus not only below all doing in the motive sense, but all willing as the commencement of any spiritual movement. That which energizes in us "*both to will and to do,*" be it nature or be it a divine life, must be something still lower, still more interior than either the *doing* or the *willing*.

"For out of the heart there come forth (ἐξέρχονται) evil thoughts" (Matt. xv. 19). The words are stronger than this. They mean more than thoughts in our common conception of an image or notion, or merely passive mental exercise. "Out of the heart come forth (διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ) evil reasonings," purposes, conclusions, not formed after they come out, but having received their shape and feature, their organization, their constitutive energy, down in the heart itself through some process of spiritual chemistry unfelt, as it is unknown, to the upper consciousness. They have been *conceived* there, to use the strong metaphor of James i. 15, and brought to birth in this interior generative chamber of the soul: "Then lust, as soon as it hath conceived (συλλαβοῦσα, aorist participle), breedeth sin, and sin, immediately finished (ἀποτελεσθεῖσα), is pregnant with death." The work down there has been fully done before it comes forth. They are no abortions, no half-formed things, possibilities, susceptibilities—some would call them—*tendencies* to evil, but having in themselves no moral character. Such is not the meaning of the apostle's remarkable language and most expressive metaphor. The ἐπιθυμία, the *desire*, hath conceived and generated sin; the sin is full formed, full grown, and hath already generated death.

"*Out of the heart* proceed evil thoughts." And what a brood are they when they thus come forth from the dark womb of depravity, from the evil mother-heart, and take those specific names of crime, and those outward forms (as distinguished from the inner evil constitution) to which they are shaped by the relations and circumstances of the outer life. Listen to the terrible muster-roll: "Murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, blasphemies;" or, in the fuller statistics of the apostle, "enmities, strifes, jealousies, ruling passions (θυμοὶ), divisions, heresies, envyings, revilings, whisperings, backbiting, malice, cruelty." They are not only lusts of the flesh, born of the sentient nature and the sentient heart, but "lusts of the mind" or spirit, pure soul-sins having no fleshly generation—sins such as devils may commit, or disembodied evil spirits—"lusts of the mind," less regarded in our modern ethics, but really more intensely evil and more purely evil than their fleshly sisters.

"Murders, adulteries, enmities, strifes, envyings, whisperings,

malice"—these are their names among men ; these are the forms they assume in the upper world of consciousness, but no less distinct is their being and their character in the birth-chamber of the soul. There they sleep, resting yet energizing ; for rest is not inertia, but the highest energy, whether of dynamical and static or of spiritual forces. There they sleep and grow, until something rouses them to outward action, and then they come trooping forth, translating themselves, first into *thoughts*, then into *acts*, then into *words*, thus bringing into open view all their hidden enormity. And yet there has been no new thing created ; there has been no essential change ; there has been no addition, specific or generic, to the evil that before this coming forth lay slumbering in the soul. In the ordinary conditions of our humanity the naked sight of them is too horrid for us to bear unless we put masks upon them. This fact is yet a redeeming trait in human nature. Man is indeed *all* wrong ; wrong to some extent in every natural energizing of his spirit. But he is not so bad as he might be, and yet may be. In some wholly lost state he may come to love evil, *per se*, and sin may look fair to him *per se*. But he is yet short of such an admiration of evil for its own sake. He is under the dominion of an all-controlling selfishness that makes him put evil for good, yet must he first disguise it, first clothe it in some fancied form of righteousness, before he can look it steadily in the face. The reason of this is found in that strange duality of our nature which is so clearly set forth in the seventh chapter of Romans. There lies above this deep heart the region of the intellectual consciousness, of the abstract ideal virtue which a man believes he really has because he can think it ; he has not yet lost the sight of its ideal beauty ; he is not so wholly gone but that he has some kind of admiration and even love for it. It is "the law of the mind," or reason, ὁ νόμος τοῦ νοῦς, of which Paul speaks (Rom. vii. 23). This, altho in some sense a redeeming trait, as we have said, altho it remains of the divine image and the ground of human accountability, is yet, in other respects, a hindrance to a thorough self-knowledge. In passing upward through the mid-region of the intellectual consciousness, this part of the "inner man," where there may be even a seeming "delight in the law of the Lord" (συνῆδομαι τῷ νόμῳ

τῶν θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, Rom. vii. 22), these ugly children of the evil heart change face and voice. We could not otherwise bear their deformities when they come forth to the upper air. Even the most depraved—in intensity we mean, for in the extensity or totality of depravity all men are alike—even the most depraved have something of this “excusing conscience” (συνείδησις ἀπολογουμένη, Rom. ii. 15), which, instead of being proof that man is not depraved, is the very gauge and measure of his spiritual fall. It shows the number of degrees by which the *actual* heart has fallen below the *ideal* mind, altho even the latter has been dragged down by the former to an extent immeasurable when compared with the index of the divine righteousness or the standard of perfect holiness.

We shrink from our thoughts as they rise up in the soul and stand before us, as they sometimes do, in their unclothed hideousness. The best of men have had this experience which the very evil, or those who have sunk to a lower grade, or who are more fortified in worldliness and conventionality, cannot understand. Sometimes they rise suddenly before we have had time for that habitual preparation which the soul involuntarily adopts. We see anger for a moment with its real face of murder, envy with its demon scowl, revenge before it has had time to assume its look of injured righteousness. We shudder at their momentary ugliness. Unless far gone in that intensity of evil which darkens even the ideal virtue, we cannot bear the sight, and so “Down, down!” we say. We drive them back sometimes until we have thrown over them another dress or given them another name. We confound our *reasons* with our *motives*, the one being from this upper or ideal region, the other from the dark yet terribly *moving* world below. Or, rather, we invent, unconsciously invent, fair *reasons* for foul *motives* that would not bear the light, or that would frighten us should they suddenly translate themselves against our will into their native image and their true vernacular name.

No distinction is so important as this between our *reasons* and our *motives*, and yet none so seldom made either in our practical or our speculative ethics. There is no more fertile source of an ever-deepening self-delusion. Our lives are spent

in this strange war between the ideal virtue and the actual depravity, or in the attempt to impose upon ourselves some abstract form of good as a disguise to that deep-down moving impulse in the soul we cannot bear to look upon. How easily, too, do we succeed in this bad work, without seeing the wretched manner in which we daily and hourly cheat ourselves! What we call our reasons are without us. As brought in aid of things within, they connect themselves with us in numberless ways. Some of them may have a real tho a weak and partial connection with the true motive power working within the heart, and these drag in others related to them, and that seem still more plausible and fair. In our endless relations with other men, and with the outer world around us, there may be some reason, yea, in appearance some good reason, assigned for almost every act. There are plenty of them standing objectively before us in the world of things or facts. They would suit well as motives. There are no reasons why they may not be our true subjective reasons; that is, our motives. They *ought* to be our reasons—that we see plain enough—and why then may they not be taken as such; so plausibly do they stand in our way, and so easy is it, because so delightful, to imagine that they really are our *moving* powers; especially since we all admire, and even so bravely laud, the abstract righteousness. The process is so natural; the transitions come so easily out of one another. Really these righteous reasons might well be among the possibilities that move us. It must be a love of right and nothing selfish that is urging us on. We love to imagine that this is so. The imagination easily passes into a thought. We love to think it, and so we do think it. We say it to ourselves. Before we are aware we find ourselves saying it to others. We say it to the world; for in talking to the world we not only talk, but ever think we are thinking virtuously. Now are we sure that these good reasons, so easy to find on every side of every act and every question, are the real motives, the real powers that *move* us, and so the delusion is complete.

We are sincere in this—sometimes very sincere—but sincerity is not truth. We feel virtuous often, very virtuous, in a state of soul which some after and deeper awakening shows may

be full of foulness and deformity. There are, however, times when we have a true glimpse of this lower world, of this spiritual Hades, or invisibility within us. It may be that peculiar facts, whether in our outward or our inward life, have removed in some degree the veil that hides us from ourselves, or some strong foreign light, in power resembling that which shone round Saul of Tarsus, may have cast its rays far down, even to a depth which the ordinary consciousness, tho it may be the "accusing conscience," fails to penetrate. We shudder as we see the serpent's head, and sometimes almost hear the serpent's hiss. We turn with horror from ourselves. We are troubled at the thought of the Holy One. We have some faint conception of what the vision must be when our "secret sins are set in the burning light of his countenance." "Rocks, fall on us; mountains, cover us from the sight and from the gaze of the Infinite Purity." Surely there is a local hell, but the power of hell must be within the soul itself. We cannot hide from ourselves in the great uprising

"When man to judgment wakes from clay."

Such was the voice of all that was wisest in the heathen world. Nothing can be more vivid, nothing outside of Revelation itself was ever more solemn, than the picture which Plato has given of the naked soul when all its hidden scars stand out, and a glance reveals that realm of darkness which had been so covered by "outward things, whether of the body, or of birth, or wealth, or education," or, in a word, by all that stands between it and the Judge, all that stands between it and the soul's own direct and searching inquisition.

There is, then, in the fallen human spirit a dark work-house of evil thoughts, a chamber of evil imagery, as secret as that which the prophet saw occupied by the elders of Israel (Ezek. viii. 7-12). It is something more and truer than an accommodation when we apply this language to that *terra incognita*, that unexplored region which the Bible calls "the heart," and from which Christ tells us there come forth so many evil things. "At this time," says the learned and pious Halyburton, in giving a most graphic account of his religious experience—"at

this time the Lord gave me light to see what my heart was doing in the dark." Something like this, with more or less intensity of painful conviction, must be the feeling of every one who has attained, in any degree, to the true self-knowledge, that true heaven-given "*γνώθι σεαυτον*," so much talked of in the schools of philosophy, yet so little known except as it is learned in the school of revelation.

A thorough investigation of this subject requires a comparison of the Greek and Hebrew names for HEART.

The sense of *καρδία*, the Greek name for heart in the New Testament, is much affected by the usage of the corresponding Hebrew term. In classical Greek it is employed mainly for the stronger or bolder affections, such as courage, hope, encouragement, brave endurance, with but slight if any direct reference to the intellect. The best example is in that line of Homer, *Odyss. xx. 18*, which Socrates quotes as an illustration of the human duality, or the bold, brave heart bearing up against hardship and temptation: *τέτλαθι δὴ καρδίη, κ.τ.λ.*—"Be strong, my heart, thou hast endured worse than this." The Latin *cordatus* has something of the mental sense, tho even as thus denoted it is the wisdom of the heart, or *prudentia*, in the old acceptation of that word as *providentia*, or a wise discernment of Good, in distinction from scientific or speculative knowledge; so *φρόνησις*, in Greek, is a taste or sapience, rather than science. The same may be said of all the Greek ethical terms built upon *φρον* or *φρεν*, as *σώφρων*, *σωφροσύνη*, *φρονημα*, *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, *φρονημα σαρκος*, the "mind of the spirit," the "mind of the flesh," or the "carnal mind." They are all more moral than intellectual; they all denote states, dispositions, aptitudes for certain kinds of knowledge, rather than knowledge itself.

Our English word *heart*, tho etymologically the same with *hheart*, *chart*, *kard*, *cor*, *cord*, denotes generally the milder and softer affections of pity, love, desire. Thus we make a contrast between the *heart* and the head, as between the affections and the intellect; and sometimes we err by carrying this distinction into our reading of the Scriptures, where it does not so much prevail. Something of the Greek and Latin sense appears still in the word *courage*, a Norman derivation from the

same root, and shows itself also in the Saxon *heart*, *heartiness*.

In distinction from all these, the Hebrew word, and from it the New Testament Greek word, have a meaning peculiar to themselves, and found almost without exception in the Scriptures. This consists not in any general application of the term to different states and affections of the soul, as in other languages, but in the superadded and peculiar Scriptural idea that there is something about the heart, and especially the human heart, most mysterious and unsearchable. This is the Bible peculiarity, whatever be the psychological territory assigned to it, be it wide or narrow, be it moral or intellectual, or a compound of both. It is the hidden region, the soul below consciousness, the place in which are born, according to the order of their descent, emotion, thought, conception, action, speech.

It differs also, this word *לֵב*, *καρδία*, or *heart*, from the other Hebrew words for soul in life, in being, beyond them all, most peculiarly human. To understand this it may be remarked that the general words in Hebrew significant of spirituality, such as *ruah*, *nephesh*, and *neshamah*, represent the vital dynamic power of animation in different aspects and degrees, but each in its widest sense. *Neshamah* may be said to denote animation simply. *Nephesh* corresponds to the Greek *ψυχή*, as significant of all that is immaterial, or rather incorporeal, from the lowest animal life upward to the spirit of man in its highest aspect, altho we think it is never applied, except anthropopathically, to Deity. *Ψυχή* and *nephesh* represent the general continent, be its particular contents more or less, and in which, when predicated of man, dwell first the mere vital and vegetable yet still immaterial powers of growth; then the dynamical life as exhibited in strength and motion; next the *irascible*, as Aristotle calls it, the *θυμός* or *θυμοειδές*, with its wild unreasoning and undirected passions or mere excitements, the same in men and animals; next the appetite, *ἐπιθυμία*, or the *θυμός*, or mere *irascible* motion directed toward something, but still unreasoning, and therefore properly styled blind; next the purer affections allied to the reason and the conscience; and finally the *νοῦς*, mens, or *mind* in all its range, including the perceptions, the conceptions, the memories, the intellectual and moral intuitions.

In this manner, both *ruah* and *nephesh* are predicated of life or spirituality in its widest extent, from all that is above the body upwards, with this difference, that *nephesh* is employed of the life of animals as well as of men; whilst *ruah*, tho embracing both these, and being connected sometimes even with the vegetable world, extends beyond them all to the divine spirit, or the great source of all life, moral, physical, and intellectual.

On the contrary, לֵב, *leb*, *heart*, when employed in the Old Testament, either for soul, as it generally is, or for some department or action of the soul, is ever and altogether human. It is ever the heart of man, or when employed of God, it is only by a species of anthropopathism. It sometimes denotes the whole spirituality as distinguished from the flesh; sometimes, like the English *heart*, it expresses the tenderer affections of pity and love; at others it has more of the Greek sense of courage, strength, heartiness; it is employed more extensively at times than the Latin word for the intellect, or knowing faculty, as in Prov. xvii. 16: "Why is there a price in the hands of a fool to get wisdom, and he has no heart for it?"—that is, no capacity, faculty, or mind for it.

Thus it has even a wider range of applications than the corresponding term in any of the other languages; but amid them all, and qualifying them all, there is that one peculiar thought already mentioned, and which it seems never to lose in any passage of its occurrence. This thought is everywhere, more or less, whilst in certain cases, and those the most important as exhibitions of moral truth, it forms the essential idea. The heart, whatever it embraces of intellectual or moral, or of both combined, is that part of the human spiritual constitution which is most interior, *most hidden*, not merely from other souls, but from the man himself whose heart it is. It is the region, acting, stirring, thinking, feeling, willing, yet below consciousness. Whilst employed for all that *cor* and *καρδιά* mean in Latin and Greek, and *heart* in English, the Hebrew *leb* goes still beyond them and below them. It admits not of being characterized in any precise psychological language; it will not be confined by any psychological classification. It is not the reason; it is not the affections, or the appetites, or the will, or the susceptibili-

ties, or the conscience. It is not any of these, tho more or less including them all, but the deep seat of moral life and action, unknown and unknowable to man, known only to God. When we say unknowable, we mean by any direct sense-knowledge or intuition. In this its interior seat, and its profound action therein, we neither see it nor think it, nor even feel it. We are conscious when it acts, and of its action as a fact. We know when it has moved, or been moved, by that which is thrown up. We see what comes out of it; and from this we are not only assured of its existence as a powerful agent, but its motions, as acts and facts, become the subjects of outward knowledge. "The heart is *untraceable* above all things (so it should be rendered): who can know it? I the Lord *search* the heart and try the reins" (Jer. xvii. 9, 10)—"*Inscrutable est cor. Ego Dominus scrutans cor et probans renes.*" "Thou, Lord of hosts, thou triest the reins and the heart" (Jer. xi. 20, xx. 12). "The Lord seeth not as man seeth, the Lord seeth the heart" (1 Sam. xvi. 7.)

Not only the springs of this action, but also the manner of its acting, are below our direct knowledge. In this interior subconscious department of the soul there is not merely a moving, a throbbing, a general life-action, but also a direction of movement and act. There is a combining of affinities, a repulsion of antipathies. There is a loving and a hating, a choosing and a refusing, a *velle* and a *nolle*, a willing and an unwilling, a self-satisfaction and a self-excusing—all real, yet unknown to us in their primal and immediate agency. They are ourselves, yea, our deepest selfhood, tho shut out from our acquaintance and sometimes utterly disowned. There are *motives* moving there, real, powerful, controlling motives, some of them of giant strength, that we recognize not, that we suspect not, and whose very possibility even, if it were charged upon us, we would most indignantly and, it may be, most sincerely deny. There is a war going on between these motives; some are conquering others; but we know nothing about it; we know not which is victor until it manifests itself by an irruption that disturbs the upper self, and that is known to the objective consciousness. We know it by the progress we have made. There is something, too, in after life and after experience that clears our

vision, and we look back and see in memory's light what we saw not when the movement was actually taking place. We have gained a light that enables us to look over the obstacles that then intervened, and we see what "our heart was doing in the dark." This may seem a paradox as thus expressed, and yet how poor must be that experience that yields not some testimony to its truth! There must have been something on which memory lays hold, and which enables it so clearly to see the motive and the conflict, before unrecognized. There is some way in which we connect it with ourselves, and therefore have we used the term *sub-conscious* rather than one which would give the idea of total unconsciousness. There is a silent untestifying consciousness, if we may call it so, which afterwards wakes to life, and knows that it then knew, and what it knew, altho it made not then the knowledge known to the outer, thinking, acting, talking man. If these seem like riddles, they are all involved in that strange duality of our nature which the Bible teaches and the truest experience confirms.

But we would press it farther still. There is an intellectual as well as an emotional action; yea, it may be said that there is even a logical movement going on down there. It is a chamber of thought as well as of inquiry. There has been a proposing, an intending, a weighing, an estimating, a concluding, a shaping of good *reasons* to cover bad *motives*, a dressing up of the thoughts before we permit them to see the light and appear openly to ourselves. There are not only tastes and instincts there, and tendencies and dispositions, but even a knowledge keen and active, knowing yet unknown. There has been a reasoning going on there. We know this, too, from the mental and moral progress we have made. We have been walking in our sleep, and our spiritual somnambulism has had its processes as regular, as steady, as unerring—yea, sometimes even more unerring—than our waking, conscious, skilfully constructed syllogisms. There must be such combining of powers, and such analytic processes, of which the upper thoughts present no specific indications, and which are only known to the outer man in the generic direction they give the conscious life. These hidden powers cannot be blanks having no tendency to some thoughts and things, or to some directions, more than to others.

They cannot be blind, or work without their patterns, their law or laws, and these workings and these directions and these laws must have working in them some kind of shaping, guiding intelligence. We may call it instinct, nature, governing principle, what we please; it cannot change the fact or lessen the mystery. The Bible calls it the *heart*, the "deep heart," the "dark or darkened heart" (Rom. i. 21), the "untraceable heart" that "God alone can know," the "hidden man of the heart," the deceitful heart whence come forth the thoughts, the images, the purposes, all having their forms, their structures, their ethical relations, their *moral character* given to them in the varied workings of that hidden power in which they had their conception and their birth.

The great proof of this is God's Revelation, a revelation not only of Deity, of eternity, of salvation, of a life to come, but in a most emphatic sense a revelation of man to himself. Our own experience, whether gracious or natural, gives us an assurance of the veritable existence of such a spiritual world within; it furnishes, too, at times a glimpse of its strange manner of working, and of the strange work it does. But the Scriptures are full of it, and their meaning cannot be mistaken. They tell us not only of the soft heart, the tender heart, the hard heart, but also of the impenitent heart, the unbelieving heart, the evil heart full of evil thoughts and evil purposes. It speaks moreover of the "understanding heart, the wise heart," the abode of light and grace, and the "darkened heart," the "foolish heart" (*ἀσύνετος καρδιά*), the "unintelligent heart," the unreasoning heart, or the falsely reasoning heart, the abode of an evil sophistry, vain reasonings (*διαλογισμοῖς*), and given up to false and foul imaginations.

This same heart it declares most difficult of knowledge, if not wholly unknowable except to God. It pronounces the man a fool who trusts it (Prov. xxviii. 26), or confides in his own grace-unaided powers of knowing it. It speaks of it as a fountain of life, and sometimes as a fountain of death. It is to the soul what the organic heart is to the body; the one the spring of moral as the other of physical vitality. In both senses may we regard the word as taken in that profound aphorism of Solomon (Prov. iv. 23). "Beyond all keeping (*omni custodia*), keep

thy heart (or, watch thy heart), for from it are the outgoings of life." It represents this heart as moving when the upper surface of the soul is still. It wakes when we sleep, and sometimes, when stirred within by a foreign heavenly impulse, it talks with us in the night watches (Ps. xvi. 7). At such times we are told to "commune" with it (Ps. iv. 4), as the secret shrine of an oracle whence the divine voice addresses us. In the Scripture-taught liturgy we pray that God would "make us to know wisdom in the hidden part" בְּסֵתֶם (Ps. li. 8), the *shut up*, the *enclosed*, the *profound*. Compare the Hebrew word (Ezek. xxviii. 3) and the same thought of the heart's profundity (Ps. lxiv. 6). We are told of a *truth* deeper than that of the words, of the images, or even of the thoughts. It is the "truth that God desireth in the inward parts"—טִיּוֹהַת, another word for the heart in this deep aspect of it. We have the same word (Job xxxviii. 36) where the distinction between the spiritual profound and the imaging, thinking, or outward discerning faculty of the soul is strikingly brought out: "Who hath put wisdom בְּטִיּוֹהַת in the sealed place (*cæmentum obductum*), or who hath given to the mind intelligence?"—"Quis indidisset præcordiis sapientiam aut quis dedisset menti intelligentiam?" (Tremellius.)

So, too, are we taught to pray that God "would explore us and try us," as wholly unknown to ourselves. We are told that "the heart is divided," dispersed over innumerable vanities; and so the Psalmist prays (Ps. xxxvi. 11), "*Unite my heart*," make one *my* heart, not our hearts in the plural, but the individual heart—"Unite my heart to fear thy name." There is a civil war in this hidden kingdom. Not only are the appetites warring with the reason and the conscience, according to Plato's vivid picture of the Republic of the Soul, but one evil passion is battling for the mastery with another, and all this has come from that great revolt of the whole man from God of which Plato did not know, and which he does not take into the account in his method of cure and conciliation. It cannot be healed by philosophy, by asserting the supremacy of the *Nous* or reason. It cannot be pacified by any prudential treaty between the warring lusts, whether they be lusts of the flesh or lusts of the mind. The place is too far down for any earthly philosophy;

an "enlightened self-interest" is powerless to reach and quell the strife. Diabolus has been enthroned in the citadel of Man-soul. The war in the heart itself can never be settled until peace is first made with God, and hence the significance of those latter words in the Psalmist's petition, "*Unite my heart to fear thy name.*"

The pious soul, the awakened soul seeking to know itself; the intensity of the petition called out by this feeling is unsurpassed by anything else in the devotional language of the Bible. It shows how deep was such a soul's conviction of the great unknown within, how important it deemed the knowledge, and with what an earnestness of prayer it longed to possess it. No human philosophy could give rise to this; no human philosophy could understand it: "Search me, O God, and know my *heart*; try me (test me) and know my thoughts; and see if there be any evil way in me (*via doloris*), and lead me (*in via eternitatis*) in the way everlasting."

The Bible teaches all that has been said about the *heart*, or the soul below consciousness, not, however, in the language we have employed, so far as it is drawn from the schools, but in its own vivid penetrating imagery—in that revealing language of "the Word that is living and powerful, sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit (the sense and the reason), the joints and the marrow," and which thus becomes "a critical discerner of the *thinkings* and the thoughts of the soul:" *κριτικὸς ἐνθυμησεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδιάς* (Heb. iv. 12). These two nouns take in the sum of the heart's action—the first denoting the present actual *thinking* as it rises up to consciousness; the other, the thoughts, purposes, movements, or states of the soul as they lie below. Compare Matt. ix. 4: "And when Jesus saw their *thinkings* (*ἐνθυμησεις*) he said, Why do ye think evil in your hearts?" He looked below the movement which was making itself visible, altho they had only spoken to themselves, or thought to themselves, away down into that lower fountain out of which the thoughts arise. He saw that whatever *reasons* these scribes might be putting on as disguises, or however sincere they might be in believing these to be their real reasons, their virtuous, their religious reasons, still the *motives* or moving powers in that sub-conscious lower

world were very different. "This man blasphemeth," said they. Doubtless they spoke sincerely and thought sincerely so far as this upper thinking was concerned. They unquestionably felt very much concerned for the honor of religion. So "they said to themselves" and thought to themselves. We think there was no consciously designed hypocrisy here. "They verily thought they were doing God service." But Christ looks down to this "sealed place," this "hidden part" of the soul that was concealed from them, and he saw that "they were thinking evil in their hearts." Unless, too, we regard the writer in Heb. iv. 12 as employing a merely intensive tautology in the use of *ψυχη* and *πνεῦμα*, "soul and spirit," there is here also this same distinction between the *motive* coming mainly from the physical, the animal, or sentient part of our nature and the *reason* which the abstract ideal virtue takes to hide, even from itself, the baseness of the former. When man ceases to be animal (*ψυχικός*, 1 Cor. ii. 14) and becomes wholly or predominantly spiritual (*πνευματικός*, 1 Cor. ii. 15, xv. 44), then the motive and the reason are one, the *heart* is no longer divided, the harmony of Mansoul is restored. In the natural depraved state, or during the healing process, it is the Word of God, whether we take *logos* here in the sense of Scripture or the Living Word, that severs this false connection, exposes this subserviency of the higher to the lower action, and thus lays bare this wretched imposture that the soul of man is constantly practising on itself. Altho hard to be shown, yet it is an undeniable fact in the human psychology that a man may be for many long years thus deceiving himself, and at last awake to the full consciousness, the clear and certain knowledge, that the *reasons* which he had been most sincerely representing to himself and to others as his veritable motives, or moving powers, were not his motives. Other lords had had dominion over him; other powers had moved his soul, and his *thought* to the contrary, or, if any prefer to call it so, his consciousness to the contrary, was all delusion.

This view of the deceitfulness of the human heart and of its hidden nature is given to us, it may be said, in the more devotional parts of the Scripture, and therefore we are not to take it in its strict, logical, or philological import. It is found in the

impassioned denunciations or expostulations of the prophets, in the petition of the contrite for the healing of a divided and broken heart, as the strong language of metaphor would express it. It meets us in the prayer of the alarmed sin-convicted man for a deeper knowledge of himself. In all this, it might be said, we have "the language of the emotions," a language not psychologically true, but ever to be regarded as hyperbolical and to be received with much poetical allowance.

To such a view there is, we think, a perfect answer in itself—an answer grounded on the fact that strictly philosophical language, as we call it, or the bare language of the intellect, must ever fall short of this wondrous depth. Poetry, which even the dry, pure reasoning Aristotle declared to be a more earnest thing than history, can alone approach without reaching remotest verity. All language destitute of emotion here must necessarily, or from that very fact, contain an essential falsehood and insufficiency. This developed into a wider argument might furnish a sufficient answer to any such objection, and prove that on certain subjects the language of the emotions is truer than that of the intellect.

But it is not alone in the poetical parts of the Bible that this mystery is taught. In the sober yet wondrous Scripture histories there are presented to us plain hard facts that assume it as a settled truth in the divine dealings with man, and in the divine revelations of human nature. Not in rapt impassioned language, but in the style of ordinary narration are we told of the prophets being sent to one man to reveal to him "what was in his heart," and of which he knew nothing altho he was, at that very moment, thinking to himself false *reasons* for the very acts to which it moved him; to another, to shut up and harden his heart that he might not see it; to another, that he might show him the awful crimes that were then being born within, altho he indignantly and most sincerely denied their possibility; to another still, to make it clear to him that his own vehement condemnation of an ideal act was but the righteous sentence passed upon his own unknown, unconscious, unfelt, actual sin.

We are told of a dark, wicked heart that did not know itself, but must be made to act *out* before it can gain that knowledge,

or be known to others. In this case it was for the divine glory, and for the world's good, in the bringing out and protection of the chosen world-people, that that heart should be made to show itself. But this malevolent spirit lacked physical courage. Pharaoh had a weak as well as a wicked heart, and this physical weakness must be strengthened to enable him to carry out (not to originate) the inward motions of the cowardly evil soul. So God strengthened, gave *nerve* to Pharaoh; for this is the meaning of the Hebrew קוּחַ, so often used in this connection. He nerved him; it was a positive operation, but not on the moral constitution or moral action of the soul. It was an action, a positive action, but on the sentient or physical heart, in order that the bad *spiritual heart*, no worse, no better than before such action, might come forth and be revealed.

This "hardness of Pharaoh's heart" has given great trouble to commentators from Origen down, and it might seem, therefore, rash to speak so positively about what its true import is, yet the writer must express the opinion that a careful attention to the primary sense of the Hebrew קוּחַ would have saved a great deal of the moral difficulty. The sense of this verb as thus used is wholly sentient and physical. The primary idea is *binding, tightness*, hence *firmness, hardness*. In Kal it is transitive, to be tight, hard, bound, firm; hence to be strong, etc. In this sense it is frequently joined with אָמַץ, of which the primary idea is steadiness, endurance. Thus the frequent קוּחַ וְאָמַץ, "be tight and hard;" be *strong* and *firm*. This may be in good or in evil; the moral quality not at all entering into the force or significance of the expression. The Piel sense in each of these verbs is causative and intensive of the Kal (or first conjugation) idea—to *make tight* or *tighten*; to bind hard, to strengthen, make firm, make steady, make to stand, etc. This is especially seen in the application of both verbs to the different members of the body, as in Isaiah xxxv. 3: "Strengthen (make tight, קוּחַ) the weak hands, make steady (אָמַץ) the tottering knees." Thence is it transferred to whatever in the body is supposed to be the seat of physical courage or firmness. Hence, in this way, its frequent connection with the heart, the physical heart of flesh and blood, the seat of animal and sentient vigor, or, if

it is predicated of the heart in a more spiritual sense, it is as the supposed seat of emotions and desires, having no reference to the moral state of that heart, but only to its spiritual firmness in carrying out its purposes or impulses, good or bad. Nothing can be farther from the real meaning of this phrase, as thus applied, than any idea of rendering hard or cruel what in itself, and without this, was mild and compassionate. The Jews had doubtless the same moral sense that we have, and the fact that none of the Bible writers, historical, devotional, ethical, or apostolical, betray any more moral repugnance to this language, notwithstanding its frequent recurrence, shows a radical difference of conception in respect to its true import. It means the giving strength, firmness, tightness to a cowardly heart whether that heart be morally good or bad. Here in the case of Pharaoh it was a base evil heart that God tightened, strengthened, hardened. It was the only way in which it could be made to reveal itself: "For this very purpose have I raised thee up (העמידתיך Exod. ix. 16) *made thee to stand*, that I might show my strength in thee;" or, as it is admirably rendered by the apostle, Rom. ix. 17, ἐξήγειρα σε, "*roused thee, woke thee up*, gave thee vigor and animation." This was the Lord's dealing with Pharaoh's bad heart.

In thus regarding the word as denoting a physical effect, we avoid that merely *permissive* view which has never, in fact, been satisfactory to any thinking mind; since it only creates a new difficulty, or removes the old one farther back. On this account Calvin rejected it. His strong, clear judgment saw at once that it was superficial and settled nothing. But aside from any general reasoning, nothing can be more opposed to this "chaffy" permissive sense, as Calvin calls it, than the etymological and radical image of the word. It would be difficult to find in any language a term more intensely positive than the Hebrew *hizsek*. It is the last one that would come to the mind as suggested by, or suggestive of, any mere negative conception of sufferance, or letting alone. It was not a mere permission to Pharaoh, but an actual doing something to him, a direct influence upon his sentient nature. It was as tho there had been given to his base, cowardly spirit an invigorating *cordial*; that is, an *heart-strengthener*. There is really nothing more that should disturb us here in such hardening, tightening, or nerving of the sentient heart,

whether good or bad, than there is in God's giving health to the wicked man, through which he performs his wickedness, or in suffering him to live. The difficulty is not here. If there is any, it goes back where all such difficulties ever go, to the inexplicable origin of evil. Whence came Pharaoh's evil heart? or how came there evil hearts at all? Alas, we know nothing about it but the awful fact. Every form of religion has this difficulty. The Arminian, the Pelagian, the holder to a moral accountability in even the poorest sense, has it pressing upon him theoretically as much as the Calvinist. None escape it but the atheist, and he does so only by plunging into outer darkness and rejecting all moral ideas whatever.

What shows that the moral sense has really nothing to do here with any difficulty is the fact that it never raises the objection in the opposite case (opposite in purpose tho precisely similar in direct psychical action) where God strengthens, nerves, invigorates the good heart. Thus we stumble not when we read how the divine "strength was shown in the Apostle's weakness," and yet how illustrative is it of the same fundamental psychological truth? This beneficent power may be exerted on the sentient nature; it may even take effect on the bodily constitution. In such cases it is analogous in all respects to the seemingly opposite process of a hardening or nerving in evil. But for good we find no difficulty in supposing a deeper operation than this, even upon that "hidden part" where human knowledge and human eloquence cannot reach, but which is accessible to the divine strength. This heart, whose spiritual maladies no human power can heal, God visits directly by his grace, and makes even its weakness the theatre of his own greatness. And thus the paradox clears up: "When I am weak, then am I strong; wherefore I glory in infirmities that the power of Christ may rest upon me."

Again, the Bible tells us of the good man who has yet much evil generally, or some deep, specific evil buried in his heart. There it lies far down. He knows it not, nor can he know it by any ordinary means. Even the direct verbal message sent from God cannot, of itself, fully reach it. He credits it as a fact, but he does not clearly know what it means. His reverence receives it from the seer, but this is not enough; this alone

would do him but little good. He must feel it; he must see it; it must somehow be brought from its lurking-place and put before his eyes. A divine power simultaneous with the verbal message might bring it forth to light and consciousness, but beside this, or along with this, there is sometimes, as we are taught in the Scriptures, another method. There is set in motion a train of providential circumstances in the outer world that, with the verbal messages and the inward grace, they may at last reveal the man unto himself. There is a *sibba* (סִבָּא), a *bringing out*, a bringing *about* or *around*, as it is called (1 Kings xii. 15), all ordered by the Lord, and sometimes dating away back of the event to whose revelation it is all intended to be subservient. Such a *sibba*, or revolution, or bringing *about*, may include a great variety of intervening means and causalities. They may be motions in nature, in history, in human wills, all *turned* by God "as the rivers of waters are turned," without breaking any physical laws in the one case, or interfering with any essential evil or any essential virtue in the other. Thus Hezekiah, even after his sick-bed repentance, did not know himself. His convalescent heart was still the seat of a foul and flatulent vanity. Had the prophet told him this in so many words, he would probably have never learned the lesson from him, tho ever so attentive and obedient outwardly. He would not have known what they meant. There must be something to draw it out of his heart, something that might operate as a spiritual catharsis; and so, away from beyond the desert, from distant Babylon, came the messengers sent verbally by the king, but truly by the Lord. They were a wheel in the *sibba* or circuit through which God was effecting the purification of Hezekiah's heart. These Babylonian messengers are very different from the prophet. They have no message from the Lord, no word of divine grace, and yet they are to be the means of opening the bolted evil "treasure" of his soul, even as he opened for them the vaults of his earthly wealth. "For it is written: He showed them all the house of his precious things, the silver and the gold, and the spices and the precious ointment, and all that was found in his treasures." Now was the prophet's time to get access to this hidden place. The king had shown his treasure-house to the Babylonian ambassadors.

"Then came Isaiah unto the king," and showed him what was in the treasure-house of his heart. His sinful vanity was exposed even to his dull vision; there was opened a deeper and darker storehouse than that which had concealed his kingly wrath. And now, too, he had ears to hear. The prophet's message became intelligible; its voice reached the interior chambers of his soul; the door stood open, and he could not help seeing the darkness of the place, and having a glimpse of the dark forms that still dwelt in it. "He saw what was in his heart," is the expressive Bible language—not only effects but causes; not only the mere *movings* of vanity, of which he might have been made sensible by outward signs and outward language, combining with outward experience—and on which he might have put the excusing guise of some fair *reasons*—but the foul thing itself, lying coiled away in a dark region which before was far below his knowledge, far below his direct consciousness, and yet, more than anything else, pertaining to his spirituality, his veritable self.

There is much "instruction in righteousness" to be derived from every part of the history of this King Hezekiah, but none surpassing that of the wondrous chronicle which closes the account of his reign: "Howbeit, in the business of the ambassadors of the Princes of Babylon who sent unto him to inquire of the *wonder that was done* in the land, God left him to try him, that he might *know all that was in his heart*." Most marvellous the motions of the dual shadow, but more mysterious still the shadow in his soul that moved below his consciousness, and stranger than all, the combined spiritual and physical method which God took to reveal it unto him. Oh! had we but eyes to see the moral wonders that are continually presented in the world within us, we should find less difficulty in yielding our assent to the outwardly miraculous or supernatural, as it is recorded in the Bible. The lesser incredibility would be swallowed up in the greater, so surpassing all ordinary sense evidence and yet, in certain states of the soul, so impossible to be disbelieved. We talk of the laws of nature and the secrets of nature; what are they to the abysses of the unfathomable spirit?

In this story of Hezekiah there is a lifting of the curtain just giving us a glimpse of the divine procedure; but it is not an

isolated case. This mode of giving self-knowledge is revealed as a part and practical portion of the Mosaic law. Thus, Deut. viii. 2: "And thou shalt remember all the way which the Lord thy God led thee these forty years in the wilderness, to humble thee, and to prove thee, and that thou mightest *know what was in thy heart*, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments or not; and that he might make thee know that man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live." How little do they know of the wondrous depth of the Old Testament who call it the book of the outward, the ceremonial, in distinction from the spiritual, and would therefore regard it as obsolete to the higher spirituality of our modern cycle! Self-knowledge is revealed as one great design of God's dealings with his people—not the boastful *γνώθι σεαυτόν* (know thyself) of the schools, not "the knowledge that puffeth up," but self-knowledge, that it may become cleansing knowledge, healing knowledge, and thus the spiritual life, or head of immortality. Some might smile at the thought of comparing Moses with the Phædo, and yet what is there in Plato's dialogue on the immortality of the soul (sublime as it is in idea, and to a right thinking, most conclusive in argument) to be compared with the depth of those few words—"that he might make thee know that man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord." The Sadducee saw nothing in them, but well does our Saviour say of these and other things he quotes from the ancient law: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." That there is a *knowledge*, and at the same time a life, is a fact which the highest human philosophy cannot fully understand, but which is most abundantly revealed in the Scriptures.

Our subject is rich in illustrations of a similar kind from the Old and New Testaments. What did Peter know of his heart?—we mean not his torpid, unstirred being regarded as a mere potentiality—but what did Peter know of the moving, imaging, choosing, willing, warring world within him when he made that memorable declaration: "Tho all men should be offended in thee, yet will not I be offended;" or so vehemently affirmed: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee to prison, or even unto death"? Our Lord's prediction was founded on no foreseen

change, but on what he then saw moving and living in his heart, altho all unknown to Peter.

Who ever obtained a keener insight into the profoundest depths of the human nature, carnal or spiritual, than the apostle Paul? and yet what a vast unknown to himself was his own inner world of thought, emotion, will, and motive, one moment before the heavenly light shone round him on his way to Damascus! Could we see that heart as it was then intensely energizing; could we see it as Paul saw it not, as Paul knew it not—that heart so full of hate, of “malice, wrath, and all uncharitableness;” that heart so sincere in its malice, and at the same time, as he afterwards well knew, boiling over with blind, selfish, Pharisaic rage against the fairest form of truth and love that had ever yet appeared on earth,—could we have looked down into that boiling crater of passion, that dark receptacle of foul *motives* so disguised when they came forth with the masks of fair and specious *reasons* that even their subject did not know them,—could we have seen all this, and then that same heart, the same in personal identity, and yet, oh, wondrous mystery! transformed, yea, more than that, new-born and new-created—that same Paul kneeling before Ananias, the wrath all gone, the heart now filled with love, welling up with the waters of life, budding with the fruits of faith, no longer Saul of Tarsus, but a “man in Christ,”—could we see these two states lying so close together—see them in the very realities of their being, in the very power of their energizings—how ineffably must such a spectacle surpass in wonder and in lofty interest the highest ideals of philosophy, the profoundest marvels that nature ever presented to the scientific analysis. Paul at Jerusalem, not merely consenting to but heartily *approving* the cruel death of Stephen, crying out against the martyr, “casting off his garment,” and throwing dust in the air, even as the mad Jewish mob afterward showed their rage against himself; Paul on his way to Damascus “breathing out slaughter” against the friends of the Redeemer, and Paul kneeling on the sands at Miletus, ready now “not only to be bound,” but also to die for the Lord Jesus! What a transcending mystery is here! The whole evidence of Christianity might be safely rested on the utter impossibility of accounting for it except on the supposition of an unearthly and supernatural

power. There is something more wonderful here than any physical marvel, it transcends any miracle in nature; there is something that goes beyond even the historical verity, strange as that is; it is the fact, not to be questioned, for it is even now before our eyes—that some new light had come into the world from which the human mind could form the glorious ideal.

Paul before his conversion knew not himself. "I did it ignorantly," he says, "in unbelief." Not ignorant of facts, not merely mistaken or led astray by outward errors misleading a pure intention, but ignorant of his *motives* even when moving him with their intensest energy. He had mistaken for them the *reasons* which he had superimposed. It was not ignorance of the Scriptures, ignorance of dogmatic truth, but ignorance of himself, his ruling will, his deeply hidden yet ever-active, ever-choosing, refusing, approving, condemning, reasoning heart. Had he known that selfhood as the devils know it, as perhaps some wicked men on earth may know it,—had he been so intensely evil as to have looked his evil in the face unflinching,—had Paul thus known his own heart just as it was on that wrathful journey, he never would have found mercy. But it would contradict his other teachings should we suppose that he meant to acquit himself, or that he regarded the blinding ignorance of an evil heart as anything else than the measure of the depth and *extent*, if not the intensity, of his depravity. Some wicked beings may know themselves better than others who are less depraved, but this is neither justification nor palliation of the evil blindness of the soul. *Αγνοῶν ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ*, "unknowing in unbelief"—the apostle no more means to excuse his want of knowledge than his want of faith, and we may fairly infer from his words here, as well as his teachings elsewhere, that the absence of the one is no more the test of accountability than the absence of the other. "I am not conscious in myself (*οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύννοιδά*) yet herein am I not justified, but he that judges me (*ἀνακρίνει*, searches, separates, analyzes, discerns me) is God." (1 Cor. iv. 4.)

The case of David has less of the supernatural, but in no narrative of the Bible is the great psychological mystery more wonderfully exhibited. Here is something worthy of our deepest study: the abstract virtue pronouncing sentence, not hypocritically, but most sincerely tho most unconsciously, on the

heart's own actual yet undiscovered depravity. When Nathan the seer came with his divine message and his divine light to this most deeply sinning man, the latter had no more true notion of the hell within him, and which had just led him into such enormous outward wickedness, than many a man of seeming health has of some deadly disease concealed in the most secret chambers of his body. How very righteous he was, how unconsciously, how vehemently righteous! But it was the sentence of his own lips that the divine grace made use of as the means of opening his own soul, and then the prophet's voice found access. Through that opened door it went down to the dark vault of evil. David had a glimpse of his own heart. It was this awful sight that made him fall upon his face and cry out, "I have sinned." Then it was that he uttered in spirit that agonizing petition, "Oh, hide thy face from my iniquities!" In the light of this most graphic yet most profound narration, we see the reason of that searching language of the fifty-first Psalm, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and make new within me a spirit of righteousness." I was born in sin; oh, teach me truth "in the *inward* parts," and "in the hidden part, oh, make me to know wisdom." Exposed thus to himself, how intense became his conviction of exposure to the Divine Eye! and yet it is the same feeling in its more softened meditative form that led him to implore its merciful searching of this dark selfhood, so near to him and yet so hidden from his ordinary knowledge.

TAYLER LEWIS.

CONVICT LABOR AND THE LABOR REFORMERS.

THE employment of the prisoners in the various penal institutions of the United States has become one of the most vexatious of legislative questions. Measures for its regulation or limitation, the exclusion of certain branches of industry from the prisons, or the restriction of the number of prisoners to be employed in any industry, are pressed upon the legislatures of several States from year to year with the persistency and unity of action which the trades-unions have learned to employ so efficiently in settling the relations between the workingmen and their employers, until the subject has come to absorb an amount of public attention entirely out of proportion to its real magnitude and importance.

Labor and capital, so long and so bitterly antagonized, have upon this point foregone their eternal differences, and united zealously and heartily in a common object. The usual expedients by which legislators are accustomed to stave off or wear out the importunity of their constituents have resulted only in strengthening the earnestness and consolidating the efforts of the small but compact and determined body of men who have planted themselves upon the position that the competition between convict and free labor in the mechanical industries must cease. The subject, which demands the calm and dispassionate examination of experts, and whose complications are so many and difficult that even these fail often in agreeing upon important details of it, has been forced into politics, where it should never have entered at all, and has added a new element of bitterness to caucuses, and another source of demoralization to the elections, in which the labor reformers, disregarding all other issues, seem ready to cast their united vote for those who will promise obedience to their dictates.

Argument and demonstration have, so far at least, failed to convince them of the unsoundness of their conclusions, or the weakness of the premises by which they have reached them. A single fact seems, with them, to swallow up every other consideration, viz., that criminals work, while honest mechanics are forced to remain idle. The appearance of wrong upon the face of this is so patent to them that they accept it as conclusive, ignoring the fact that this is only a single feature of a subject embracing many branches, no one of which can be safely neglected in taking account of any other. Their earnestness and sincerity may be freely conceded. The fact that every commercial or financial disturbance brings distress and disaster to the mechanics and their families in increasing proportions; the encroachments of machinery upon the province of the laborer, multiplying many fold his power of production, and making over-production and its consequent stagnation more and more easily possible; and the knowledge that the amount of work to be done is not, and probably never will be, sufficient to employ the hands that are willing and anxious to do it, and which depend upon it as their only means of livelihood, are amply sufficient to justify the jealousy with which the man who must live by his labor regards every unnecessary competition.

Sympathizing fully and heartily with every legitimate effort on the part of such men to protect their rights or promote their real interests, it seems to me that in this case they are mistaken, first as to the necessity which underlies the competition of which they complain, and second as to its amount, and I purpose to show in this paper why mechanical labor has become a necessary constituent of the prison systems of most of our States, and what is its extent and power as a competing element in the labor market.

Every one, with scarcely an exception, concedes that persons who have been convicted of crime, and sentenced to imprisonment in consequence, ought to labor. Humanity demands the distraction from remorse and despair which manual labor affords to the mind of the prisoner. The discipline of a penal institution depends very greatly upon this distraction, and upon the habits of obedience and order which systematic labor engenders and promotes.

And there is almost equal agreement that the expenses of imprisonment ought, either wholly or in great part, to be met from the proceeds of the prisoner's labor. "He who breaks the law should pay for its enforcement," is a saying whose truth and justice long since commended it to popular acceptance. So far the labor reformers agree with their opponents.

But if the prisoner must work, and support himself from the product of his work, the question arises at once, How is this to be done without interfering or competing with labor outside of the prisons? The labor reformers answer this by proposing to distribute the employments of convicts among the several industries carried on by free workmen in proportion to the number of the latter engaged in each. Nothing seems easier or simpler than this in theory. There is no question whatever that if the labor of the comparatively small number of inmates of the prisons of this country could be thus divided among the industries carried on around them, the competition with them would be reduced to proportions too small for appreciation. While the effects of its production would still tell upon the general production of the country, the amount added to that of any particular trade or pursuit would be very slight indeed.

But in attempting such a distribution difficulties, entirely insurmountable, meet us upon the threshold, which can only be overcome by a complete revolution of our prison systems. Many kinds of business cannot be carried on at all in the limited areas of prison enclosures. Others are dangerous, from the fact that the tools necessary in them are easily converted into efficient and deadly weapons; and still others require a constant communication between the workmen which the discipline of the prison forbids. Agricultural pursuits, which Sir Walter Crofton has adopted with so much success as a part of his system, require for their successful administration radical changes in our penal laws, prominent among which would be the "indefinite sentence," the rigid classification of prisoners according to their age, sex, and degrees of criminality, and the exaltation of the reform of the prisoner to the first place among the objects of his imprisonment. All of these are desirable; but the people of this country have not, to any considerable extent, been brought to recognize

the fact, and until they are, their adoption of them, or of any system in which they are prominent features, is not to be expected.

And these, like the coarser, ruder kinds of labor, such as stone-breaking and road-making, fail utterly in enabling the convict to earn his own support. Under the Crofton system, the idea of the prisons being self-supporting is ignored almost entirely. And the rougher classes of employments are objected to on account of their degrading character by very many thoughtful people, who insist that the occupation of the convict should not destroy the remnant of self-respect which may have been left to him. The effects of such labor are simply deterrent, and while it may be adopted as a punishment for vagrants, and the short-term prisoners of a jail, it is not likely to be used in any large prison or penitentiary. Whether it degrades or not, it does not pay. For it is not to be forgotten, in treating this subject, that the cost of maintaining convicts, tho reduced to the lowest point by good management, is considerable, and that cost must be met by public tax, if it is not defrayed from the products of prison labor. Whatever may be the right or wrong of the matter in the abstract, there is no doubt that the immensely greater number of our people want their prisons to support themselves, and the people of the United States are sovereign. Prison industries must then of necessity be productive. The lower grades of employments fail in this respect to meet the requirements of the case, and must be stricken from the list.

Again: in attempting to distribute the employments of our convicts in proportion to those of the free workmen about them we are met by the fact that while each State regulates the affairs of its prisons in its own way, it has no control over the industrial pursuits of its people, or their intercourse with those who are separated from them by lines which in commercial respects are purely imaginary. An impartial distribution of prison industry according to the employments of the people of any one State might, and in most cases would, discriminate directly against them to the advantage of others. The effect of such distribution by individual States would in every case be to bring the prison competition more directly home to the parties who complain of it. The labor reformers generally, when pressed

upon this point, frankly admit that any equitable distribution of the labor of convicts among the various industries of all the people of our country is impossible by individual State action. The general government has no power to provide for such a distribution, and the difficulties of any concerted action towards it, by the agreement of all the States, or even the greater part of them, may be realized by a moment's reflection upon the great variety of interests and feelings involved. The agitation of the subject must be begun and sustained by the manufacturing States, while those whose people are mostly interested in agricultural pursuits will of necessity be either indifferent or hostile to the movement—generally the latter, because the manufacture of any articles largely consumed among them, by their prisons, would be a direct benefit to them, which it would require a very extreme degree of disinterestedness on their part to refuse.

Once more: in order for a business to be profitable to either States or individuals, it must be carried on in considerable magnitude. There must be enough of it to pay for its superintendence by competent persons, and this is a vital obstacle to local distribution of prison labor. The tendency of all manufacturing concerns is more and more towards concentration in large establishments, where the expenses of supervision and direction can be spread over the largest possible surface.

Then, machinery has become inseparable from nearly every department of mechanical industry, and where it is used there is always economy in collecting a considerable quantity of it together. The large shop can employ a variety of labor-saving machines beyond the reach of the smaller one, and to fit up and stock one great establishment is much cheaper than to start two or three with the same productive power, while in the competition between the greater and smaller concerns the latter go to the wall inevitably. This is evident in every branch of business. The wayside shop which did the work for a neighborhood is starved out, and its occupant has gone into the factory or turned his attention to other business. If he remains at all, he lives by repairing the work of the great establishment rather than by making new articles. Such being the facts, it is easy to see that the profitable employment of convicts in small squads, such as would be necessitated by local distribution of

their labor, is difficult in the extreme. The business in which several hundred men are engaged gives room and scope for the development of individual capacity of every variety. If a man fails in one department of it he may be successful in another, and he can be shifted from post to post until his proper place is found. In the smaller concern this is impossible, and all of the most successful employers of convict labor agree that while there may be a handsome profit in working large numbers of prisoners, small lots are undesirable. This was illustrated in a very conclusive manner in the State prison of New Jersey last year. A proposition had been made to the supervisor of the prison, by parties of the first responsibility, to take its whole available force, amounting to more than six hundred men, at prices of from *sixty* to *sixty-five* cents per day for the labor of each. But while this was pending the legislature passed an act forbidding the employment of more than one hundred convicts in any one branch of industry. As the proposal had been made for a single trade, its acceptance was of course impossible, and when the contracts in existence at the passage of the law expired, the most diligent advertising only resulted in bids for a little more than half the available force, at prices averaging *thirty-seven* cents per day, or a little over, for each. After two months' delay, during which the entire mass of convicts, except those employed in prison duties, remained idle, the supervisor was enabled, by allowing a shirt-making firm to divide the departments of its business into three distinct contracts, to find work for four hundred and forty-five men at *fifty* cents each per day, leaving more than one hundred and fifty in enforced idleness. The direct loss to the State by this experiment amounted to fully thirty thousand dollars yearly, besides the two months' time sunk in its beginning. And this was not the whole of it. It was found that the accommodations which had been ample for six hundred men under one or two employers were hardly sufficient for three fourths of that number under seven. Each contractor required a separate shop and distinct facilities for storage of materials and manufactured goods and for shipping, and to make it possible to employ the remaining one hundred and fifty at any kind of productive labor a considerable outlay was necessary in buildings, not

likely to be needed when the project of an intermediary prison, which has long been agitated, is carried into effect.

In view of such facts, it is easy to conclude that, so far as financial results are concerned, one great industry in a prison is better than half a dozen or more. It does not require very much study of the subject in its practical relations to reach the further conclusion that the discipline of the prison may be better maintained when its officers have to deal with one employer of convicts than when they must keep watch over a greater number. Local distribution, if made in proportion to the industries carried on in the State, would seldom require less than ten or twelve, and might easily need twenty or fifty.

General distribution, if it were possible, would meet most of the difficulties of which I have spoken. Under it there would be little trouble in providing that one branch of business should be followed in one prison, and another in another, until nearly every trade available for convict employment was fairly represented. I have shown why, in my judgment, this cannot be done.

It seems evident, then, that the employments of convicts must be limited to certain branches, and that in order to provide by them for the support of the prisons, either wholly or in any considerable part, they must be mechanical. If the free-hand laborer cannot live in competition with machinery, it is idle to expect the convict to do so. The disadvantages in the situation are all on the side of the latter. The free workman has the incentive of receiving the entire product of his labor, and the reputation he can gain by its quantity or excellence. He has generally a family dependent upon his exertions, and in most cases hopes by success in his business to lift himself or his children to higher social or financial positions. But the convict has no such stimulant. His interest in the character or quantity of his work is confined to his desire to escape punishment for coming short in it. Under the Crofton system, like that adopted in the Elmira Reformatory of New York, he might hope to shorten the term of his confinement very materially indeed by cheerful and faithful service; but such systems are exceptional everywhere, and their adoption with us is still in the future. In most instances he knows nothing of the trade he has to follow when

put to work at it. Generally his previous habits have been such as to give him a decided distaste for steady work of any kind. It is the idle, the vicious, the worthless, those whose constitutions have been broken or enfeebled by intemperate or vicious habits, who make up the mass of our prison population. Such men work only under compulsion, and their service is that of the eye rather than the heart; now and then one of them may do the full work of an average free man, as now and then a slave has equalled his free competitor in performance, but in general the value of convict labor may be set down as little if anything above the price paid for it by contractors—usually about one half or one third a free workman's wages in the same business. The stock is bad, to begin with, and it is idle to expect very good results from it. For such men, mechanical work, as at present conducted, is admirably adapted. The minute subdivision of labor, by which each person is made to do only a small part of any process of manufacture, enables the prisoner in a very few days to become proficient, if he desires to do so. And when it is remembered that by far the greater number of convicts are in prison less than two years, the advantages of such treatment are apparent at once. They can be made to earn the expense of keeping, feeding, and clothing them in this manner; the work is not severe in general; the facilities for massing them upon the limited space of the prison-shops are complete, and the maintenance of discipline rendered easy.

Labor reformers and others, it may be noted at this point, complain that this treatment makes the convict little better than a part of the machine with which he works; that he learns no real trade by which he can support himself on leaving the prison; and that his labor, confined to such a narrow and unvarying routine, is depressing and degrading to both mind and body.

To this it may be answered, that his work is exactly the same as that of the free laborer in the factory outside the prison. The same machinery is used, the same subdivision of tasks obtains, in both cases. No one learns a full trade in the old acceptation of the term any more. Each boot or shoe passes through the hands of a "team" of men, in every great shop, varying in number from four to ten or eleven, each of whom

does but a small part of the work upon it and nothing else, and few take the trouble to perfect themselves in more than one or two subdivisions. As with the shoe trade, so with all the others. The man who stands before a machine, which by a single motion of his arm bores a hole in each of a dozen or twenty brush-blocks, all of which, when set in their proper places, revolve in regular order by the action of the machinery until the whole block is properly pierced, learns only a small part of a brush-maker's trade; but he learns that part quickly, and, by doing nothing else, soon acquires a precision and rapidity of motion almost equal to that of the machine. Skilled labor is a thing of the past in most trades, and the list of those in which it is still necessary diminishes almost daily. A general knowledge of the various divisions of any trade is required now only for the workman who repairs, and these are becoming scarcer every year. The introduction of machinery into manufactures leads inevitably to the concentration of the business into great factories and the minutest subdivisions of labor. If these are evils, they are no worse in the prison than out of it.

As to the desirability of convicts being taught trades during their confinement, by which they may be able to support themselves at their discharge, practice proves that very few indeed of them will follow, when free, the business at which they were engaged in prison. Many of them have a very deep-rooted dislike to everything connected with their imprisonment, nearly all seek work in other departments of industry, and the most the prison can do for its inmates in this respect is to teach them habits of order, regularity, and sobriety, which are the best introduction to any trade, and the surest aids in its pursuit.

But, conceding that mechanical labor is best adapted for prison purposes under existing circumstances, we are met by the complaint of the labor reformers, that in thus narrowing down the list of convict occupations we are creating an unjust and injurious competition with them; that they are by it, in fact, taxed either directly or indirectly for the support of the prisons which break down their business and enable unscrupulous individuals to flood the markets with goods equal to their own in quality, produced by labor for which only a nominal price is paid.

As to the last count in this indictment, after what has been said about the value of convict labor in the preceding pages it is only necessary to add that the estimate these gentlemen insist upon fixing upon that labor, as "fully equal to that of a free workman," is scarcely complimentary to the industrious and intelligent workingmen whom they claim to represent. If any one else but their own leaders should so far forget the respect due to them as to degrade their productive capacity to the level of the vicious and demoralized set from whom our prisons are mainly recruited, the insult would be promptly resented. Alas for the free country whose citizen sovereigns will do no more for themselves and their children than the convict in the prisons will do for the fear of the paddle or boot-heel gag!

That the employment of convicts in mechanical labor does create a competition with those engaged in the same business which may, under certain circumstances, become injurious to the latter may be freely conceded.

All productive labor is competition. We are compelled, every one of us, to compete with some one in some way or other, and there is nothing which convicts can be made to do, down to the most menial services of the prisons, that free persons would not do if they could. If, as the labor reformers assert, "the State has no right to enter into competition with its citizens in the pursuits they have chosen for themselves," the prisons should stop working at once.

Before granting so much, however, it may be well to inquire into the extent of the competition against which so much complaint is made. The accomplished and able chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor found in 1879 an aggregate of 47,769 persons in the prisons, penitentiaries, and reformatories of the United States, whose labor was distributed as follows:

Making agricultural implements.....	602
" boots and shoes.....	6,581
" brooms.....	268
" brushes.....	1,010
" carpets.....	175
" carriages and wagons.....	1,251
" cigars and tobacco.....	510
" clothing.....	2,262
" fur hats.....	593

Making furniture of all kinds.....	2,884
“ iron goods.....	3,504
“ laundry work.....	315
“ leather and leather goods.....	787
“ stoves.....	1,687
“ wooden goods.....	1,120
As farmers and laborers.....	10,607
In prison duties.....	4,930
In miscellaneous manufactures.....	1,036
Idle, sick, or infirm.....	7,647

Of the 40,122 convicts at work, 15,537 were employed as farmers or laborers, generally under the lease system of the Southern States, and in the prison service; leaving only a competing element of 24,585 in manufacturing pursuits, in which there were, by the census of 1870, 1,297,611 free persons engaged—a proportion of one convict to fifty-three free workmen, or a little less than two per cent of competition taken as a whole. In a few branches, however, this proportion is exceeded, rising to three and eight tenths per cent in boot and shoe making, five per cent in the manufacture of brooms, forty per cent in brush-making, and about ten per cent in fur hats. Thus it will be seen that only two trades have any just reason to fear convict competition—the brush business, which requires but a moderate amount of capital, and the manufacture of fur hats, which demands rather more. If these two trades were excluded from the list of convict employments altogether, and the persons engaged in them distributed among the other branches, the addition to the latter would scarcely be felt. Unfortunately for all parties, the labor reformers have not taken the trouble to gauge the amount and value of convict competition with any kind of exactness.

The convict population of the United States is now about one tenth of one per cent of the whole, and not likely to exceed that proportion very greatly for many years to come if ever. It is possible, by well-regulated prison, reformatory, and preventive measures and systems, to reduce it very far below this ratio, and even as it is there is no real danger in it for American workmen, except in its concentration upon a very few departments of business, as the labor reformers themselves admit that a competition of five per cent is not injurious to the trades they represent.

Such a concentration is possible. The brush and fur-hat business could be absorbed by the prisons entirely. Is it reasonable to suppose that this will be done? Suppose the number of persons in the prisons employed in these trades to be quadrupled, would not the effect be a stagnation as disastrous to the prison industries as any others? Is it in any way likely that the managers of prison labor would go on from year to year manufacturing goods which could not be sold, and which depreciate rapidly in value in the holding? Would there be any advantage to them in so flooding the market that the manufactured goods could only be sold at heavy loss? The prisons are exposed to the competition of every one. No one proposes to protect them in the possession of industries which they have, it may be, introduced and made their own by long practice. No one hesitates for a moment to set up an opposition to them in any business so long as there is reasonable prospect of his succeeding in making a profit by it. Is the State the only body which has no rights that others are bound to respect? Is it, the representative of the whole of its people, the exponent of their united powers, the protector of their rights, to be limited and crippled in the performance of the duties imposed upon it by restrictions which no one thinks for a moment of putting upon himself or any one else?

And is not this idea of claiming protection against competition of any kind singularly un-American? We propose to compete with the whole world. We throw our doors wide open to its labor element and receive it without stint. One hundred and fifty-five thousand skilled workmen of foreign birth are computed to have landed in New York during the last two years, and thrown themselves into competition with the labor of our citizens by birth or adoption, in the trades they propose to follow. Does any one ask for legislation for the limitation of that competition? Our machinery is doing the work which hundreds of thousands of hands would scarcely be able to perform; shall we enact restrictions upon American invention? We pride ourselves upon our labor-saving contrivances, every one of which does work, or saves work, which a man or woman might do and be paid for doing; shall we forbid its competition by legislation?

And, finally: we put upon the State the duty of guarding and restraining persons whose crimes make them dangerous to society. We delegate to it the task of punishing them, and if possible bringing them to repentance and restoration, and both of these ends must be reached through labor if reached at all. Are we prepared to cripple and hinder the agency we have set up for these purposes because it in some measure conflicts with the pursuits the individual citizen chooses to make his own? Is it not worth our while to conclude that it is the business of our prison managers to work out the punishment and the reformation of the prisoners committed to their charge by the best and surest means within their reach, leaving individual interests to take care of themselves? The citizen who engages in business which he finds unremunerative has the privilege of changing it for another at pleasure. The State cannot so easily change either the location or the occupation of her wards. She must keep them safely and employ them in such a manner as to maintain discipline and provide for their support, or she fails in the trust committed to her. And if in doing so she entirely absorbs by gradual process this or that branch of business, no one has any right to complain of her.

This is the conclusion to which we shall ultimately be driven, and the sooner we reach it the better. Every limitation of the manner or means of employing convicts other than the broad general principle that their work shall produce the best results for them and the prison, and through it for the community whose agent and representative it is, is a step in the wrong direction, a blunder scarcely less than criminal.

Here I might stop, but for the fact that in their complaints of convict competition the labor reformers have chosen to concentrate their attacks in great measure upon a single detail of prison management, important it is true, but not important enough, I think, to justify them in pressing it upon us to the exclusion or the injury of vital reforms which might ere this have succeeded, could one half of the energy that has been wasted in assailing the system of contracting convict labor been expended upon them. To most of the labor reformers, and to many others as earnest, and at least as disinterested as they, the contract system is the sum of all villainies in prison manage-

ment; a wrong to the convict, whom it makes the slave of the contractor who has purchased his labor; a wrong to the prison, whose discipline it subverts to the convenience and profit of men who have only a commercial interest in it; a wrong to the employer of free labor, by compelling him to compete in the market with manufacturers who have paid only a nominal price for the labor they employ, and to the workingmen by exposing them to an injurious and degrading competition.

Now it is easy to admit a part of these charges, while others have been more or less fully met in the preceding pages. Let me acknowledge that the contract system is far from perfect, and would probably find no place in a perfect prison system. The error of its assailants, however, is in attacking it, rather than the evils which underlie it, and make it indispensable; in proposing to abolish contracts without first providing the means which would enable us to do without them; without, for instance, separating our prisons from political interference and taking measures to secure fitness and permanency in our prison service. We have none of these things. We seem, in fact, now farther from their attainment than we were thirty years ago. Our prison offices are almost without exception the rewards of political service, and their holders are displaced with every turn of the political wheel. Is it to such agencies as these that we are to turn over the management of great commercial enterprises, in which the ripest experience, the fullest knowledge of the markets, the highest executive ability, and the sternest integrity are necessary to success? For the management of the industry of a thousand or fifteen hundred men is no trifling matter. The agent who has no direct personal interest in its success seldom brings either profit or credit to his employers in such a transaction. And if that agent is to be, as we seem to insist he shall be, a political hack only, what but disaster can result from committing such a charge to him? Yet this would be the first result of abolishing the contract system. The only substitute proposed for it is to work the prisons by State officers for the account of the State. Now we have tried to do this over and over again. We did it in the State of New York for instance, at a dead loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was tried in the Elmira Reformatory under circum-

stances which ought, one would think, to have insured its success, if it could succeed anywhere—freedom from political interference, and a superintendent of long experience and acknowledged ability; tried until the legislature grew weary of appropriating money to meet its annual deficits, and decided that the contract system, under which Sing Sing and Auburn and Clinton prisons had become self-supporting or nearly so, should be substituted in its stead. Its failures in this country have been many and disastrous, its successes very few indeed.

But suppose it were possible to realize from public-account working all that its advocates claim for it. Suppose we could obtain thoroughly trained and entirely capable prison officers—men of probity and honor, with the ability, the commercial talent and experience, and the personal enthusiasm necessary for the highest development of the resources of our prisons—and insure them a tenure of office for life or during good behavior; that we could construct a prison staff as the staff of our regular army is organized, and with the same *esprit de corps*, and that the prisons managed by such bodies should be self-sustaining—what would the manufacturer or mechanic who now complains of convict competition have gained by the change? If the convicts are to support themselves by the products of their labor, what difference to the parties engaged in the same branches of industry whether the State or the contractor employs them? At least as many goods would be made in the prisons under the former as under the latter. Those goods would be sold in the same markets as now, and the competition would be the same in every particular. If the contractor can hold his goods and flood the market with them to the injury of the outside manufacturer, the State agent could do the same, with the entire capital of the commonwealth behind him. The business, if successful at all, must be conducted on business principles, and these are the same whether administered by public officers or individuals.

Neither is it certain that the convicts would gain by substituting public-account working for the contract system. The warden may be, and generally is, a salutary check upon the rapacity or the tyranny of the contractor, but who is to intervene between the warden and the prisoner if the contractor is taken

away? The latter must observe the rules of the prison. The warden makes them and can walk over them at pleasure. Contractors and their agents are no better than they should be, but every act of brutality on their part can be matched or excelled by a similar one perpetrated by the keeper or his aids. If the prisoner is gagged, or paddled, or showered, or if his naked, quivering flesh is scorched with burning kerosene, it is the keeper who does it in every instance. And it is the keeper whom the humanitarians on the one hand and the labor reformers on the other propose to make the convict's taskmaster. Is there the slightest probability in the world that the morality of the State officer, his justice, his humanity, his kindness, will excel that of the contractor? The one has received his office, not because he is the fittest and best for the discharge of its duties, but because he has been an effective instrument in elevating his party to power; the other comes to the prison in order to profit by the purchase he has made of the labor of its inmates. The standard is not likely to be high with either, but the man of business is generally as safe as the politician.

With prisons so officered and controlled, contracts are unavoidable. That grave abuses are frequently fostered by them is not to be denied. But with their aid we can manage to keep our prison industries in some degree of efficiency, even with the loose and faulty administration of inexperienced and unqualified officers; without them the institutions sink into chaos or worse. It should be remembered, in treating this subject, that the question is not between an ideal prison system—that which we hope to see adopted generally at some date not too far in the future—and the contract workings, but between the system of management we now have and are likely to keep, for some time at least, with contracts, and the same faulty and often corrupt concern without them. Having known something of both these alternatives, the former seems to me by far the less evil of the two.

And in justice to the contract system it must be said that most of the evils of which so much complaint is made are not inseparable from it, and disappear entirely under conscientious and capable prison officers. Contractors say, with great unanimity, that the profits of their business depend very largely

upon the maintenance of the discipline of the prisons, and frequently render valuable aid to the keepers in support of it, and it is by no means certain that contracts cannot be so managed and guarded as to be beneficent parts of the best system of prison management attainable for us during the present generation.

However this may be, there can be little doubt that other parts of our prison system should be thoroughly and radically recast before attempting the abolition of contracts for convict labor. We have not, as I have said, yet begun the separation of our prisons from politics; we have scarcely attempted to provide them with officers prepared for their work by special training, and commended to it by fitness only; the classification of convicts according to their ages, sex, and degrees of criminality is still in its infancy among us; fear rather than hope remains the prime and almost the only incentive to obedience in nearly all our prisons; and the idea of making the term of imprisonment largely dependent upon the conduct of the prisoner in most cases, is regarded by many of our best and most intelligent citizens with distrust or aversion. When we shall have settled these fundamental parts of our system of the future we shall doubtless find the contract question has ceased to be troublesome. Till then its agitation is untimely, and a hindrance to reform.

A. S. MEYRICK.

AMERICAN MANUFACTURES.

THE history of American manufactures, in one sense, begins with the establishment of our national independence, inasmuch as prior to that time the policy of England not only discouraged but positively prohibited the establishment of almost all branches of manufacturing industry. In another sense, however, no small or unimportant part of the history of American manufactures lies back of the contest for independence, inasmuch as in the earlier period were developed those traits of the national genius which made our subsequent industrial career possible.

In spite of the jealous and severely repressive policy of England in dealing with her colonies and plantations, the first feeble beginnings of manufacture in New England drew down but slight animadversion.

Sir Josiah Child, the eminent writer on trade, had, even so early as 1670, apprehended the danger, as the spirit of that age deemed it, of a great ship-building industry springing up in the heavily wooded colonies along the North Atlantic shore. "Of all American plantations," he wrote, "his Majesty has none so apt for the building of shipping as New England, none comparably so qualified for the breeding of seamen;" and, he added, "in my opinion, there is nothing more prejudicial and in prospect more dangerous to any mother-country than the increase of shipping in her colonies, plantations, or provinces."

But it was not until 1699 that the authorities at home actually interfered to prevent the development of industry, in the technical sense, in the colonies. In that year Parliament declared that no wool, yarn, or woollen manufactures of their American plantations should be thence shipped or even laden

in order to be transported from thence to any place whatever. In 1719 the House of Commons declared that the erecting of manufactures in the colonies tended to lessen their dependence on Great Britain. In 1731, in consequence of numerous complaints from interested persons, among whom the "Company of Hatters" in London were conspicuous, Parliament directed the Board of Trade to inquire and report with respect to laws made, manufactures set up, or trade carried on, detrimental to the trade, manufactures, or navigation of the mother-country.

Massachusetts proved to be the only important offender, and the sum of her enormities was indeed appalling.

"By late accounts from Massachusetts Bay in New England," say the Board, "the Assembly have voted a bounty of thirty shillings for every piece of duck or canvas made in the province. Some other manufactures are carried on there, as brown holland for woman's wear, which lessens the importation of calicoes and some other sorts of East India goods. They also make some small quantities of cloth, made of linen and cotton, for ordinary shirting. By a paper-mill set up three years ago they make to the value of £200 sterling yearly. There are also several forges for making bar-iron, and some furnaces for cast-iron or hollow ware, and one slitting-mill, and a manufacture for nails.

"... Great quantities of hats are made in New England, of which the Company of Hatters in London have complained to us that great quantities of these hats are exported to Spain, Portugal, and our West India islands. They also make all sorts of iron for shipping. There are several still-houses and sugar-bakers established in New England."

The immediate outcome of this investigation was an act of Parliament passed in 1732, and verily the Hatters' Company had their reward. Not only was the colonial export of hats to a foreign port prohibited, but their transportation from one British plantation to another was prohibited, under severe penalties.

Eighteen years later the griefs of another body of British manufacturers called for remedy from Parliament; and an act of 1750, while permitting pig and bar iron to be imported from the colonies into London, prohibited the erection or continuance of any mill or other engine for slitting or rolling iron, or

any plating forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or any furnace for making steel, in the colonies, under the penalty of £200. And every such mill, engine, forge, or furnace was declared to be a *common nuisance*, and the colonial governors, upon the information of two witnesses upon oath, were required to cause the same to be *abated*.

But while the Americans of the days before the Revolution were thus forbidden to practise any branch of manufacturing industry which might interfere with the market for British produce, the foundations of future manufacturing greatness were being laid where the power of Parliament could not reach them. In a very high sense, the history of American manufactures reaches back beyond the Revolution, for it was in that period that the peculiar industrial character of our people was developed.

It is difficult to write of this subject without producing the impression of exaggeration. There is only one nation in the world to the mass of whose population mechanical genius can be attributed. That nation is ours. In other countries it is only the picked men, a select few, who possess mechanical insight and aptitude, the power of instantaneously, because instinctively, seizing upon mechanical relations, and a high degree of native efficiency in mechanical operations.

With us the rule is the other way: there are few Americans, at least throughout the Northern States, who have not mechanical insight and aptitude in a degree which elsewhere would make them marked men. As a great organ of English opinion has said, "Invention is a normal function of the American brain." "The American invents as the Greek chiselled, as the Venetian painted, as the modern Italian sings."

By some persons the wonderful mechanical developments of our history have been attributed to the influence of our system of patent legislation. Unless I am wholly wrong, while our patent laws have encouraged specific invention and have multiplied a hundredfold the contrivances, great and small, useful and futile, which have been put upon the market, or at least have taken the form of models and been stored away in the government office at Washington, *the power to invent*, which inheres to so remarkable a degree in our people, was created altogether irrespective of and long antecedently to that system of legislation.

It is with us an inheritance ; and it is fairly matter of question whether that inheritance has not been impaired rather than increased during the period covered by our patent laws ; impaired, first, through the dilution of our blood by foreign immigration, and, secondly, through the relief afforded by increasing wealth from the physical necessities which so stimulated the mechanical faculty in the first settlers upon these shores.

In inquiring into the genesis of this national trait, we note, first, that the country was settled predominantly by men of that race respecting which Prof. Thorold Rogers has said that he has been unable to find any one notable invention for saving human labor originating elsewhere, excepting in the solitary instance of the carding-machine, the invention of a Frenchman. And of this great inventive Teutonic race, it was the most ingenious branch, the English, which contributed chiefly to the settlement of the Atlantic coast.

Secondly, the early settlers of America constituted, in the main, a picked population. The possibilities of gain which reside in breeding from the higher, stronger, more alert and aggressive individuals of a species are well recognized in the case of the domestic animals ; but there have been few opportunities of obtaining a measure of the effect that could be produced upon the human race by excluding from propagation the weak, the vicious, the cowardly, the effeminate, persons of dwarfed stature, of tainted blood, or of imperfect organization. The inhabitants of the English colonies, two hundred and one hundred years ago, constituted a population which was more truly selected, in the respects of mental vigor, intellectual inquisitiveness, freedom of conception, and self-reliance, than any other which history has known.

Thirdly, upon a community thus constituted were laid the severe requirements of existence under an exceptionally rigorous climate. The first settlers had brought out with them from the old country, and had transmitted to their descendants, all the desires, tastes, and ambitions proper to a highly advanced society, with but small means for their gratification.

In his admirable review of the doctrine of Malthus, Prof. Senior justly remarks that the true preventive check to population is not the dread of physical privation, but "the fear of

losing decencies." Quite as clearly is it the ambition to gain decencies which evokes most fully the spirit of self-denial and of laborious exertion, and quickens to their highest activity all the powers of the mind. It was the wants of the higher nature, which it was not impossible to satisfy in some increasing degree by labor and pains and forethought, which afforded the most acute stimulus to the scheming, devising, calculating faculty in early American life, out of which, in the course of generations, was developed that inventive power which so clearly characterizes the population of to-day.

To make shifts; to save time; to shorten labor; to search out substitutes for what was inaccessible or costly; to cut corners and break through barriers in reaching an object; to force one tool to serve three or four uses, and to compel refractory or inappropriate material to answer urgent wants—this was the constant occupation of our ancestors. Life was no routine, work was no routine, to them, as it is to the peasantry of every country of Europe; as it is fast coming to be among us to-day. Then, everywhere and at all times it was possible to save something from labor, to gain something for comfort and social decency. And, through such incessant practice, originality of conception, boldness in framing expedients, and fertility of resource grew by exercise in father and mother, and were transmitted with increasing force to sons and daughters, till invention came to be "a normal function of the American brain," the American inventing as the Greek chiselled, as the Venetian painted, as the Italian sings.

This wide popular appreciation of mechanical forces and relations constitutes a most important qualification for success in manufactures. The results of invention, in the shape of perfected machinery, might be imported in the hold of a vessel; but few of those whom the steerage brings us are fit to manipulate, manage, and care for the delicate, intricate, and costly machinery which requires to be used in modern industry. Only those who have a touch of the inventive genius can rightly build the machine, or put it and keep it in working to the highest advantage, with the maximum of effect and the minimum of waste.

"It appeared," said the *London Times* in 1876, speaking

of the Philadelphia Exhibition, "as if there were a greater economy of labor habitually practised in the States; and, in conjunction with this, there was evidence of the more constant presence of a presiding mind, superintending every process of industry.

"The best machine in the world will fail to give satisfaction if there is not an intelligent human being at hand to watch it, to detect the smallest failure in its working as soon as it is developed, and to suggest and supply the means of correcting any miscarriage in its functions. Much of the mechanical work shown at Philadelphia was executed with a fineness which could not have been exceeded *if every man who had a share in its production had originally conceived it.*"

A second condition of our manufacturing industry from which might have been expected to result early and great success has been the abundance of what are popularly called raw materials.

The natural resources of the United States, in field and forest and mine, are far beyond those of any of our rivals, England, France, or Germany, and of all of them combined. Our supplies of coal for heating and for power are the wonder of the world, while our Atlantic coast is dotted with immense water powers. Our iron ores, of the greatest variety and often of high purity, are widely spread over the face of the country; are found in abundance at the least working depths, and, at places, in close juxtaposition to coal and limestone. Besides ores of iron, the United States possess, of useful metals and minerals, great stores of copper, lead, zinc, corundum, quicksilver, asbestos, asphaltum, nickel, cobalt, and kaolin. Our native woods in beauty, strength, tenacity, and elasticity are not equalled by the flora of all Europe, while their variety is equally remarkable. Where England or France has thirty or thirty-five indigenous trees, the United States have exceeding three hundred native woody species, a large part of them excellently adapted to the purposes of the manufacturer. Not less profuse is the wealth of building-stones, slates, and marbles which underlie our soil from New England to Tennessee and Alabama.

Of fibres our soil and climate exhibit a high degree of adaptation to the production of those two which are the chief staples

of the textile manufacture, cotton and wool. In the production of the former of these, whether under slave labor or under free labor, we are practically beyond competition from any field.

With such a wealth of materials upon which to exert mechanical powers so extraordinary, the question naturally arises, Why has not the history of American manufactures been one of uninterrupted success, ever since the achievement of our national independence withdrew forges and slitting-mills from the category of "common nuisances"? Why did not the United States at once take the foremost rank, and maintain their proud position, with increasing prestige from decade to decade? Why is it that, after nearly a century of effort, we are still, with all our lavish endowment of faculties, opportunities, and materials, not the first but only the second manufacturing nation of the world?

We shall not fully answer this question by saying that vast and varied manufactures presuppose more than high mechanical skill and abundant natural resources; that, besides these, there must be the faculty of organization and administration; the ability to co-ordinate the integral parts of a service and to subordinate them all to a single will; the ability to supervise the working of a complicated system, holding each agency in its place and up to its work, sternly repressing all wayward tendencies, and maintaining throughout a widely extended service a strict responsibility to the official head.

This ability, we know, characterizes in a remarkable degree the high-grade Englishman. Wholly devoid of cunning and with precious little tact, in the usual sense of that term, he has yet shown, through centuries, an exceptional faculty of organization, whether in trade, in manufactures, in finance, in military operations, or in colonial administration. Have we failed to inherit this faculty in full degree from our English sires?

Not overlooking examples of a high order of organizing genius in American industry, most conspicuously in the management of our railways, but also notably in many of our Eastern mills and factories, I think it must be admitted that there is a much better chance that a certain body of labor power and capital power, gathered together for a great industrial enter-

prise, will fall under an economical and prudent, yet bold and efficient, control if in England than in the United States.

Yet this cause, important as it is, falls far short of furnishing a complete explanation of our failure to become the first manufacturing nation of the world.

Nor shall we find what is yet lacking of that explanation in the fact that we began our industrial career but a century ago with little capital, without warehouses and factories, without machinery and apparatus; having, indeed, little more than our farms and farmhouses, each with its spinning-wheel, and having, besides, the hand tools of the blacksmith, the mason, the carpenter, and the shoemaker.

Unquestionably the scarcity of capital would have prohibited at the outset, under any conditions in other respects, a rapid development of manufactures; yet such were the industry and frugality of our ancestors, so great their industrial ambition, that, with the high degree of mechanical skill prevailing and with the aid of liberal endowments from nature, the first generation after the Revolution, say from 1790 to 1820, witnessed a vast accumulation of earned and saved wealth; and had the savings out of earnings during the generation following, say from 1820 to 1850, been put into manufactures instead of going into new farms, with all which an extension of the agricultural area implies, our manufacturing capital would by the latter date have amounted to a very pretty sum.

Since 1850 our accumulations of capital have been made at a prodigious rate of increase; but of these accumulations agriculture, not manufactures, has received by far the greater sum. On an average of the period from 1800 to 1820, we covered with population a tract of nearly 10,000 square miles a year; crossed it with roads and bridges, fenced and trenched it, and dotted it over with cottages and barns, with school-houses and churches.

From 1830 to 1850 the extension of the agricultural area was at the rate of 17,500 square miles; from 1860 to 1880 at the rate of 20,000 square miles, annually!

Had we been content with the settled area of 1850, and allowed ourselves to be confined within those limits, we should have had capital enough, to be borrowed at 6 or even 5 per

cent, for carrying on all the shops and factories for which we could have found laborers out of our fast-increasing population. But on the contrary, since the date last mentioned, we have begun the cultivation of 600,000 square miles, or more than the combined area of France, Austro-Hungary, Great Britain, and Ireland. Small wonder that capital has not sufficed both for this work and for an extension of manufactures equal to the expectations of many patriotic citizens!

The ingrained wastefulness of the native American is, doubtless, in some degree, an element of weakness in our manufacturing industry. Whether this quality is due solely to the prodigality of nature in supplying materials, for manufacture or for food, so lavishly that economy in use scarcely seems to be required, or is, in part, the outcome of a certain tendency towards a large and rapid treatment of any subject in which our countrymen may interest themselves, we need not stay to discuss. The fact is undeniable. Make the utilization of waste a problem for his inventive genius to grapple with, and the American will give it consideration; make it the matter of daily care and pains, and he will sovereignly despise and neglect it.

As the Englishman is to the Frenchman, in this respect, such is the American to the Englishman. The genius for petty economies is not his; and, to tell the truth, he does not think much of those who practise them. The influence of this cause on the success of manufactures in the United States has not been slight. Tenderly, sympathetically careful of machinery, the American artisan is habitually indifferent to economy of material.

But while we might well wish for French or Dutch economy in the use of materials, there is one feature of American productive industry—not wholly unconnected, perhaps, with the very fault we have just now commented upon—which it is peculiarly gratifying to an American citizen to observe. This is the high degree of commercial honesty which is maintained by our manufacturers.

How much there may have been in the past to justify the traditional notion that Yankees were dangerously sharp in their dealings it is difficult to say. The sneers and flings of which

the phrase "wooden nutmegs" may be taken as the type were bitter enough to have had some substantial cause.

If so, the change in our moral constitution has been not less marked than the change in our physical constitution since the days when the Yankee was always represented as lank and lantern-jawed; for certainly to-day, whatever may have been true in the past, not only is there no shadow of a reason for charging upon our people any peculiar delinquency in this respect, but it may be asserted with the utmost confidence that in commercial honesty the manufacturers of the United States, as a body, enjoy a proud pre-eminence: specifically, that neither in France, England, nor Germany is it equally safe to buy goods upon representations made, or on the strength of trade-marks or ordinary commercial brands, as here.

If we have not yet found a sufficient reason for the failure of the United States to reach the position, as a manufacturing nation, assigned by the patriotic anticipations of our fathers, where shall we search for that reason? I answer that the cause of that comparative failure is found, primarily and principally, in the extraordinary success of our agriculture, as already intimated in what has been said of the investment of capital. The enormous profits of cultivating a virgin soil without the need of artificial fertilization; the advantages which a sparse population derives from the privilege of selecting for tillage only the choicest spots,¹ those most accessible, most fertile, most easily brought under the plough; and the consequent abundance of food and other necessities enjoyed by the agricultural class, have tended continually to disparage mechanical industries, in the eyes alike of the capitalist, looking to the most remunerative investment of his savings, and of the laborer, seeking that avocation which should promise the most liberal and constant support. It has been the competition of the farm with the shop which, throughout the entire century of our national independence, has most effectually hindered the growth of manufactures. A people who are privileged to cultivate a reasonably fertile soil, under the conditions indicated above, can secure for themselves subsistence up to the highest limit of physical well-being. If that people

¹ The United States have, at the present time, but five persons engaged in agriculture for each square mile of settled area.

possess the added advantage of great skill in the use of tools and great adroitness in meeting the large and the little exigencies of the occupation and cultivation of the soil, the fruits of their labor will include not only everything which is essential to health and comfort, but much that is of the nature of luxury.

It is fair and moderate to say that when the American tiller of the soil has subsisted his family up to the highest standard of living known to the peasantry of any country of Europe,¹ he has remaining out of his seven-millionth share of the agricultural produce of the country, after paying for all the commodities and services which are essentially involved in his production, enough to support another family of equal size, which surplus he may use in purchasing for consumption the commodities or services of non-agriculturists according to his taste, or he may devote it to the improvement and development of his farm.

The standard of living among the agricultural community sets, of course, the minimum standard of wages for mechanical labor. In the abundance enjoyed by the agricultural class those participate, by the ordinance of nature, who render mechanical services which can only be performed upon the spot, where producer and consumer are necessarily neighbors. Such are the services of the carpenter, cobbler, blacksmith, wheelwright, mason, house-painter, and plumber.

But those who render to the agricultural classes of this country mechanical services which can be performed without regard to the locality of the consumer, which description includes nearly all of what are known as the factory-industries, have no such privilege. They are not admitted, by any ordinance of nature, to a participation in this abundance. Only the force of law can put their wages into a relation of equality with those of the agricultural population or of the members of the trades just characterized. Otherwise their remuneration, having no necessary relation to the wages of those classes, will be determined by the wages of mechanical labor prevailing in countries where the soil is cultivated under less favorable conditions.

FRANCIS A. WALKER.

¹ Prof. Fawcett states that in the west of England "it is impossible for the agricultural laborer to eat meat more than once a week."

THE ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN HINDOOISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

THE church of Christ, in so far as she realizes her ideal, is an aggressive church. She finds one of the chief reasons of her existence in the commission to preach the Gospel to every creature. She is bound, therefore, to be a proselytizing church, and therein claims to have and urge upon men, not one of many true religions, but the one and only faith which is from beginning to end the doctrine of God. But if this be indeed her mission ; if she is sent forth to attack and contend with hoary-headed systems which have for ages held the faith of millions among the different nations of mankind—it is plain that she ought to know what she is doing. There can be no wise missionary work without knowing with whom or what she has to contend. If through faint-heartedness we may not overrate the strength of our enemies, we can as little through a pious self-conceit affect to ignore or disdain it. The church cannot wisely afford to neglect the study of the erroneous systems of religion which she opposes, because of their supposed weakness and inferiority. As an important illustration of the work to be done in this direction, it is proposed in the present article to indicate in as brief and general manner as possible the doctrinal antagonisms between modern Hindooism and Christianity. Probably no false religion, except it be Buddhism, has equal claims on the consideration of the Christian philosopher or apologist. Whether we regard its inherent character, or the power which it has shown to command and retain the faith of a large part of the human family, it stands to-day as one of the

most notable and formidable antagonists of the church and kingdom of Christ. Such brief consideration of the Hindoo faith as may at this time be possible, may at least suffice to save some from that easy self-confidence which leads one to undervalue the strength of an antagonist, and is often the forerunner of discouragement at slow success, and sometimes even of utter defeat.

The inquiry as to what is modern Hindooism is not to be answered in a word. The religion of the Vedas cannot be said to exist. Modern Hindooism rests rather upon the Puránas than upon the Vedas. The Puránas themselves differ from one another in the most uncompromising manner on many of the most important matters of religion. There is no exaggeration in those words of the Mahábhárat :

“Contradictory are the Vedas ; contradictory are the Shástras ; contradictory all the doctrines of the holy sages.”

The difficulty of our inquiry is scarcely less if we would seek the answer through personal intercourse and conversation with the people of India. The very instincts of the Hindoo, his ideas as to the demands of courtesy, prompt him often to conceal his real opinions when he imagines that they might be repugnant to you, and to profess the most encouraging acquiescence in your statements of religious truth. Moreover, in so far as we do get at the real beliefs of the people, we find a most confusing diversity of opinion. The very naming of conflicting sects of Vaishnavas, Saivas, Kabírás, Sádhs, Sáktas, etc., is bewildering to the inquirer. The sacred books of the people are but little known by those who profess to rest their faith upon them. It is safe to say that if we except a portion of the Bhàgavat Puràna, the Ràmàyan—not the classic Sanskrit work of Valmiki, but the Hindà vernacular poem of Tulsì Dàs, which is not professedly reckoned a final authority in religion, has much more direct influence with the mass of the people in North India than all their reputed sacred books. But under the Ràmàyan, which recounts the adventures of Ràma, lies a philosophy, assumed where it is not argued, as the basis of all religion. And what is that philosophy ? The Hindoos recognize six systems of philosophy, monistic and dualistic, as Shàstra or of canonical authority. Of these, after a conflict of

centuries, the Vedānta, a system of pure monism, has come to dominate the thinking of the great mass of the people. It is the Vedantic philosophy which has had the power to combine and cement into a kind of unity that confused conglomerate of creeds and cults which makes up the totality of modern Hindooism. In indicating, therefore, first of all, the fundamental principles of the Vedantic philosophy, as contrasted with the doctrine of Christianity, we shall have before us those doctrines which permeate and give vitality and strength to modern Hindooism.

I. First of all, then, the modern Hindoo, in strict accordance with the Vedānta, believes that God is one only. The unity of God is the key-note of his faith. Not only the learned, but the lowest and most ignorant among the people are agreed in this. One may go into any village, where on every side he will see the grossest idolatry, and ask the first man that he meets, how many gods there are, and he will have but one answer: "There is only one God." The Vedantic formula is ever on the lips of those who know no other Sanskrit, *Ekambrahmanam dvitīyaṁ na vidyati*, "Brahma is one; there is no second." From these words we might at first suppose that Hindooism was at one with Christianity at least in its teaching as to the unity of God. This formula, however, expresses instead the most radical and irreconcilable antagonism of the two systems. For the Hindoo does not mean in such words to affirm that there is no second God, but that there is no second any thing! Brahma is one because he is all, and all that really is, is Brahma. If we inquire further as to the nature of the Supreme Being, the antagonism between the Hindoo and the Christian doctrine becomes still more apparent. For Brahma is said to exist from eternity to eternity as in his essential nature *nirguna, liti*, "without bonds;" by which seems to be intended precisely what certain of our occidental philosophers mean when they speak of God as being "unconditioned," or as "absolute." Of God, thus regarded, no predication can be made. He is pure essence, without attributes of any kind. To use a common expression, He is "invisible, imperceptible, formless, infinite and immutable essence;" which at once is, and was, and ever shall be, and beside which nothing else ever really was, or is, or is to

be. But God is also said to exist as at the same time *saguna*, "with bonds," or with attributes. That is, to render into western phraseology, God exists as conditioned in the universe, and is only to be known by ordinary men as such. To this effect Tulsì Dàs, the great poet of the people of North India, has expressed himself: "Both unconditioned and conditioned is Brahma's essential nature; ineffable, incomprehensible, without beginning and without his like."¹ And this is the doctrine of modern Hindooism as to the nature of the Supreme Being.

2. Immediately consequent upon the foregoing is the next fundamental dogma of Hindoo philosophy, which concerns the nature of this apparent universe of spirit and matter. What is this world, and what are souls? To this, the above statements being granted, only one answer of course can be given. If God be the only real existence, then it follows that the soul and the world, as entities distinct from him, do not exist. What they appear to be, that they are not; and what they appear not to be, that only they are. First, take the case of the soul. I seem to myself to be a person, distinct from the world, from other human persons, and from God. But this is all a mistake. In reality, my soul, as also every other soul, is essential Deity. The common people everywhere speak of the soul as being "a part of God." And yet in the same breath they will affirm that God is *akhand*, "indivisible," whence it follows that each soul is the total Divine Essence; and that is precisely the strict Vedantic doctrine! So one may go into any Hindoo village and ask the first peasant that he meets, who God is, and he will to a certainty receive the answer, *Jo boltà hai, wahì hai*; "That which speaks, that same is he." Thus while Christianity assumes the truth of the testimony of consciousness as to personality, Hindooism pointedly denies it.

But granting all this as to the soul, what then is this visible and tangible world? It seems to be real; to be also something different and distinct from myself, and therefore not of the Divine Essence. To this question a Pundit will probably answer in a familiar Sanskrit line, *Brahma satyan jagan mithyà jivo brahmaiva náparah*, "Brahma exists truly, the world, falsely;

¹ *Ràmâyana, Bål Kànd.*

the soul is very Brahma, there is no other." The same idea is expressed in a beautiful song of South India, as follows:

" God may be seen spread out in space ; yet I,
 Who looked so long, quite failed to catch the sight.
 But now, by Sivam, I declare that all
 That is, is God ; yet what I see is not.
 It and the thousand evils of the world
 Are not of God or true. They *Mâyā* are."¹

Here, of course, is a contradiction. The world is, and again it is not. This difficulty the pundits try to meet by distinguishing existence as of three kinds—viz., *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika*, and *prātibhāsika*, which terms may best be rendered respectively as "real," "practical," and "apparent." "Real" existence is affirmed of Brahma only, who is the very inner being of all being. "Apparent" existence is illustrated as follows: I see a rope on the ground, and mistake it for a snake; the existence of that snake is said to be "apparent." It is plainly not a case of absolute non-existence, because there is really something there. But it is not real existence, because that which seems to be a snake is not a snake. Hence the snake exists, but only apparently. The third kind of existence is illustrated by the case of a man who dreams, e.g., that he is trading, and giving and receiving money. That money exists, say they, not assuredly, *pāramārthikam*, in reality; nor yet *prātibhāsikam*, as in the case of the rope mistaken for a snake, for there is not in this case a reality objective to my own mind. Nevertheless that money exists *vyāvahārikam*, "practically"; because in my dream I trade with it and it becomes to me an occasion of pain or pleasure as the case may be, like real money. As long as I sleep, that money is to me as if it were real money. So with the existence of the world. It has no existence apart from the Divine Essence, any more than the money of the dreamer has any existence apart from the mind of the dreamer. And yet because I use this world, and receive from it pleasure and pain; for me it may be said to have a "practical" existence. Many, however, prefer to liken the state of the case to the existence of the snake in the other example given. For there is really something there which is

¹ "Folk Songs of South India," Gover., p. 156.

the occasion of the erroneous judgment, "This is a snake," tho indeed it is not a snake, but a rope. So, it is argued, is the case with the world. There is really something presented to my perception, which something, however, is not a world as something distinct from Brahma, but essential Brahma. Brahma does not indeed become a world, any more than the rope in the illustration becomes a snake. Yet the snake would not have appeared except the rope had been there. And so is the world to Brahma. Thus we have come upon other antagonisms between Christianity and Hindooism. Christianity assumes an essential dualism between matter and spirit, between souls and God. It assumes also that man is what he seems to be—a person. It teaches, moreover, that God is not in any sense the material cause or mere occasion of the existence of the world, but its efficient cause. All this Hindooism denies.

3. Granting, however, all the above positions, the question still remains, Why should the eternal Essence appear under the form of this present universe, rather than any other? Or, more particularly, why the existing distribution of sin and righteousness, joy and sorrow, rather than some other? Why am I what I am? Why do I do as I do and feel as I do, and not otherwise? Why, again, does the good man often suffer, and the bad man prosper in the world? To all these questions, every Hindoo, wise or ignorant, has one all-sufficient and ever ready answer, and that answer is, *karm*! *Karm* has settled every thing. All has been fixed and predetermined, but not as the Calvinist and the Mohammedan say, by God; for it is plain that the unconditioned Brahma, being without attributes and therefore without will, cannot predetermine any thing. All is due to *karm*. And what is *karm*? The word means "deeds" or "actions;" and when the Hindoo would explain all that is or happens by a reference to the predetermining power of *karm*, he indicates thereby, not any free determination in God, nor any blind power external to himself, but a law of subjective necessity; the necessity that actions performed by himself in a previous state of being should bring forth their legitimate and most inevitable result. All Hindoo thinkers agree that the whole universe, material and spiritual, and all that takes place in it, is the effect of actions done by souls as its meritorious

cause. That is to say, for example, I myself, in a former state of existence, whether as man, demi-god, demon, or beast, performed certain actions, good or bad ; and of whatsoever sort they were, they made it necessary for me to be born just when and where and as I have been, and live just the life that I have, in order to reap the fruit of those actions in reward or retribution. Thus this life, with all that is in it, all my perceptions, feelings, and actions, my joys and my sorrows, wealth and poverty, sickness and health, my right deeds and my crimes alike, like a given fruit from a given seed, are the necessary and inevitable result of actions performed in a former state of being, of which it is not pretended that ordinary men have or can have the slightest recollection. And herein we have the doctrine of transmigration of souls, together with its philosophical justification. It has found a sad expression in the following words of a song of South India :

“ How many births are past, I cannot tell ;
 How many yet to come, no man can say ;
 But this alone I know, and know full well,
 That pain and grief embitter all the way.” ¹

I do not remember to have met a Hindoo who felt that there was any thing unreasonable in all this. On the contrary, it seems to them the one adequate explanation of the universe, and above all, of the so unequal distribution of happiness and misery. For, inconsistent tho it may be with his pantheism, the Hindoo still has a conscience, and feels that sin and suffering, and especially the suffering of the innocent, must be accounted for. It is accounted for, to his mind, on this hypothesis of the performance of deeds good and bad in a former state of being. Thus if that babe agonize in pain, the Hindoo says, *Pūrv janam kà phal hai*, “ It is the fruit of a former birth ; ” “ No doubt it must have committed some great sin in a former life.” So, on the other hand, if that reprobate prosper in the world, this is thought to be just as plainly the reward of meritorious deeds performed in a former state of being. Thus the inequalities of life, and, above all, the sufferings of the innocent, seem to the Hindoo to demand the doctrine of *karm* as their only adequate explanation. Thus we have reached another of the

¹ “ Folk Songs of South India,” Gover., p. 38.

great contrasts between Hindooism and Christianity. The issue is deep and broad. It is the issue of necessity against freedom. Christianity affirms free agency both of God and man; Hindooism denies that there is such a thing as free agency either in God or in man. All is necessity. Instead of a world created by God as its efficient cause, Hindooism teaches that the world and all in it is the necessary effect of necessary action in the universal spirit. The world is, and is as it is, simply by a necessity of the Divine nature. To inquire further as to the reason of things were as if one should ask why a mango tree produces mangoes. The tree bears its fruit, not freely, but necessarily, after the predetermining nature of the tree. In like manner we bear fruit, not freely, but necessarily, after the predetermining nature of the actions of a previous life.

4. But this doctrine of *karm* brings us face to face with another issue between Hindooism and Christianity, if possible of still broader sweep and more momentous consequence. It is found in the Hindoo doctrine of *mâyà*. Christianity affirms, in accordance indeed with the very dictates of human nature, the trustworthiness of the normal consciousness of man. This Hindooism dogmatically denies. To us it would seem that all the above doctrines might be at once met and answered by a simple reference to consciousness. Consciousness tells me in language most distinct and unmistakable that I am a person, distinct from all other persons, and therefore from God, as also from the objective world around me. It tells me, moreover, that I am free, and not a creature of necessity. That this is the testimony of consciousness the Hindoo will freely admit, as who will not? But he escapes the conclusion which this would seem to compel by denying the credibility of the witness. That we seem to ourselves to be free personal agents, for example, is said to be due to the influence of *mâyà*. *Mâyà* is "illusion." It is that illusion which, to use the Hindoo phrase, the Supreme Being "throws out" in becoming *saguna*, or "conditioned," in the universe. The ideas of personality, of the substantial and separate reality of the objective world, of a personal Creator of that world, of freedom and responsibility, all alike are begotten of *mâyà* or illusion. If in attempting to meet this position we point to the actions of men, and show

how the very men who profess to hold this most extraordinary doctrine do not, and in fact cannot, act upon it, the villager will at once say, "True, true," and laugh, as if he thought it only very amusing that men should be so inconsistent; the pundit will probably refer his sceptical European friend to the old distinction between *sattā vyāvahārikā* and *pāramārthikā*, apparent and real existence, and argue after this fashion:—we do act in this world as if it were real, and it is reasonable that we should so act, because it *is* real, *vyāvahārikam*, "practically." But that does not prove that the world is real *pāramārthikam*. And this is the very power of *māyā*, that it causes us to mistake that which has only practical reality for that which is really real. The state of the case, as already intimated, is exactly like that of the dreamer, to whom all seems really real so long as he continues dreaming. But if the captive dream of freedom, it does not follow that he is really free; if, in great distress, the monarch dream that he is not a king, but a slave, he is yet, for all his dream, none the less a king. Just so if in this dream of life I seem to myself to be free, that does not prove that I am really free; if I fancy that I am any thing less than essential Brahma, this cannot alter the fact of my veritable identity with him!

5. And now, led on by an inexorable logic, we confront another of the great antagonisms between the Hindoo and the Christian systems. Christianity affirms and Hindooism denies the reality of an eternal and necessary distinction between sin and righteousness. Hindoo thinkers frankly admit this consequence of their principles, and what is more, in many fearful instances attempt in nudity and licentiousness to give their views on this subject an outward, visible, and loathsome expression. That sin has a "practical" existence, as also righteousness, that sin tends to misery, and may bring the sinner to hell for a season; and that virtue tends to happiness, and may bring the virtuous man to heaven, also only for a season—is by all admitted. This must all be conceded for the satisfaction of conscience, which, in India as elsewhere, tells of sin and warns of retribution. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Brahma is the only real existence and I am myself Brahma, it follows that sin and righteousness exist only in my conceptions,

and the distinction between them is only imagined under the power of illusion, while the heaven or the hell to which they are severally supposed to conduct us, is only a dream within a dream. In point of fact, it is argued that in reality both sin and righteousness are alike evil. For, according to Hindoo assumptions, every action, good or bad, necessitates a future birth and life in which the fruit of that action may be reaped. But personal existence, all agree, is an evil. Its continuance under any form is not to be desired. Therefore that which makes it necessary must also be an evil, even that righteous act which makes it necessary for me to be born again into the world that I may reap its reward. Thus the distinction of right and wrong is not inherent and absolute, but accidental and relative to this present life. The murder or uncleanness which is wrong for me may be right for another person. No idea is more familiar to the common people in India than this. If, for example, the missionary object to the deity of Krishna, the accounts of his unspeakable licentiousness, acts so vile that no man would be justified, even in the eyes of a Hindoo, in repeating them, the disputant will probably refer to a passage in the Bhàgavat Puràna wherein the worshipper of Krishna is commanded not to imitate the deeds to the accounts of which he listens. What was right for Krishna may be, nay, *is*, wrong for us; and to confirm this doctrine the Hindoo, if in North India, will probably quote from the Ràmàyan the words, familiar to every Hindì-speaking Hindoo, *Sàmarathi kahan nahin dosha Gusàin*, "To the mighty, O Gusàin, is no sin"—*i.e.*, in western phraseology, "might makes right." The same doctrine as to the nature of sin and virtue is expressed in a song of South India as follows :

"To them that fully know the heavenly truth,
There is no good or ill ; nor any thing
To be desired, unclean, or purely clean.

Where God is seen, there can be nought but God.
His heart can have no place for fear or shame ;
For caste, uncleanness, hate, or wandering thought,
Impure or pure, are all alike to him."¹

6. Thus in the next place, while Christianity affirms the great truth of human responsibility, the Hindoo is logically

¹ "Folk Songs of Southern India," Gover., p. 166.

obliged to deny that there is any such thing. Like self-consciousness, responsibility is an illusion. This follows, first, from the denial of a personal God. Grant for an instant the correctness of the Hindoo conception of the Supreme Being, and it is plain that in the nature of the case there can be no such thing as responsibility. That impersonal essence cannot take cognizance of sin and righteousness. Said an old woman in a country village in India to the writer, "What have we to do with God? Our business is with the *devīs* and *devatās* (gods and goddesses)." If that which speaks in me be God, there is no place left for responsibility. And again, even apart from that, if there were a personal God, yet if sin and righteousness be only the fictions of *māyā*, then nothing remains to be responsible for. And even when, over-constrained by the testimony of conscience, the Hindoo will speak as if moral good and evil were to be rewarded and punished by a personal God, still that doctrine of *karm* remains, and is no less fatal to the idea of responsibility. For if I am not free, if all my actions are determined by a law of physical necessity entirely beyond my control, then assuredly I am not responsible for them. Let it be observed again that these are not merely logical consequences attached to the system by an antagonist, which the people will refuse to admit. The Hindoos themselves, both in their authoritative books and in their common talk, argue this very conclusion. In the Purānas, again, and again those guilty of the most flagitious crimes are comforted by Krishna, for example, on this express ground, that whereas all was fixed by their *karm*, and man therefore has no power over that which is to be, therefore in the crime they were guilty of no fault. And so also among the people one wearies of hearing this constant excuse for almost every thing which ought not to be, "What can we do? It was in our *karm*."

7. And now, finally, we come to the last element in the fundamental dogmatic of modern Hindooism—namely, the doctrine concerning salvation, its nature, and the means of its attainment. All among the Hindoos agree that salvation is or should be the great end of life. This sounds well; but what is the nature of this salvation? This will at once appear by a reference to what has been already set forth. This world and

all that is in it is the result of a succession of actions by souls, all which actions are the inevitable consequence of a necessary, self-originated activity in the Divine essence, whereby, to use the Hindoo phrase, Brahm, *lilà karke*, "in sport," evolved his *màyà* or illusory power, producing thereby the semblance of a world. In consequence of this we are all in bondage to this *màyà*. Hence arises the notion of personality and of the objective reality of the world. From this, again, arise desire and aversion, which are the immediate causes of all joy and sorrow, sin and virtue. Salvation must therefore consist in the emancipation of the soul from the bondage of illusion, and consequent realization of the soul's essential identity with God and the unreality of all else than God. But this means simply the cessation of personal existence ; and inasmuch as it is by our repeated births that such an existence is continued, salvation must needs consist in deliverance from further transmigrations. Thus as both good works and bad are alike the occasions of births, it follows that salvation from sin is not the end of religion any more than salvation from righteousness. Liberation from conscious existence is "the chief end of man." Again, since according to the theory man is held in this bondage of illusion by "false conception" (*avidyà*) or ignorance, it is plain that knowledge must be the means of salvation from the power of that illusion. And this is precisely the orthodox Hindoo doctrine as to the means of liberation. It is reached by means of knowledge ; and that not by knowledge in general, but, specifically, knowledge of the soul's identity with the universal Brahma. This attained, man is then supposed to cease from desire and aversion, as their objects are perceived to have no real existence. Thus at last also he ceases to act, and the cause of transmigration being removed, the weary course is ended and personality is lost in God. But it is granted that the attainment of this transcendental knowledge and consequent liberation at death is exceedingly difficult and rare. In the great majority of cases man leaves this life only to enter on another. Hence, in perfect consistency with the above, the Hindoo believes in lesser and subordinate salvations, more after the analogy of the Christian doctrine. For tho a man may have to pass through ten thousand births before attaining final

liberation, yet of what sort those births shall be, whether into a worse or better state than the present—this is determined, not by knowledge, but by personal merit. Thus the Brāhman saves his philosophy, and yet concedes somewhat to conscience. For altho according to the prevailing philosophy all works are in a sense evil, in that they necessitate another conscious life hereafter, yet crimes are evil in a sense in which other works are not, in that they bring on a painful retribution in the life to come. By an evil course of life a man may be compelled to descend in the scale of being, and by so much his final liberation be deferred. From being a Brāhman he may become a Shūdra, a leper, a hog, or a dog; he may even be enthralled in a tree or a stone, or reappear in one of “the seven dark hells.” Thus the Hindoo finds a place in his system for that praise of virtue and deprecation of vice to which conscience incites, but which at first sight is so utterly inconsistent with his philosophy. Thus, moreover, he finds a place for all the endless rites and ceremonies of popular Hindooism, its almsgivings, its manifold pilgrimages and cruel austerities. They are all means to salvation, not immediate, but mediate. They are supposed to help to clarify the perceptions of the soul, or to prepare the way for a more favorable birth hereafter, and so in a manner hasten the final liberation through the disenthraling knowledge.

Now, while of course it is not pretended that all the people of India are metaphysicians, or would be able to sketch out this system or any other for themselves any more than people in other lands, yet it is, we believe, strictly true that the pantheistic philosophy we have briefly indicated, has as thoroughly leavened the people and as universally pervades all their thinking on religious subjects as, *e.g.*, the principles of Presbyterianism have leavened the thinking of the people of Scotland. It is the often unconscious assumption of the truth of these false principles which is assuredly the chief, and to any but the strongest faith, the insuperable obstacle to the progress of Christianity in India.

8. But altho this Vedantic pantheism is the most central and vital thing in modern Hindooism, it is not by any means the whole of it. The ideal which the Vedānta sets before men,

in a life of abstraction and rapt contemplation of the soul's identity with Brahma, is quite too far above the practical daily life of the most of men. Man is weak, and conscious of dependence ; conscience, too, even in India, ever and anon lifts up her voice in testimony of a personal God above the world, to whom man must give account. Man has thus everywhere the instinct of prayer. But, according to Hindooism, the really perfect man, he who has learned that mystic formula, *Aham-brahmam*, "I am Brahma"—he, in the very nature of the case, cannot pray. He has risen far above that low, earthly region where men in the bondage of ignorance busy themselves with the illusory distinctions of good and evil, and weary themselves in seeking to propitiate by various rites of worship, imaginary gods. But the multitude have not reached, and, it is admitted, cannot reach this supermundane elevation. Man looks for a God who shall have somewhat at least in common with himself ; who shall have capacities of knowing, feeling, and willing ; a God who shall be accessible to his cries and not indifferent to his wants ; in a word, a God who shall be a *person*. Thus at first sight Brahmanism, with its impersonal Deity, in the presence of this crying want of the human soul, would seem to be without a resource. How can the Brāhman keep his philosophy, and yet hold out to the demand of the soul of man a personal God? But just here appears the marvellous dower of Hindooism in adapting itself to the wants and instincts of the multitude. First of all, then, to the multitude of weak and sinful men, seeking some one to worship and some one to help, Hindooism says, not merely, "*altho* God is one," but "*because* God is one, ye may worship what ye will." For since Brahma is the only being, it follows that all worship, of whatsoever thing or person, and with whatsoever intent directed, really terminates on him. Starting with this broad principle, whereby all idolatry, if the premise be admitted, is philosophically justified, the Brāhman goes on to develop what is probably the most elaborate system of polytheism and demon-worship that the world has ever seen, and finds a place in its pantheon for no less, according to the popular saying, than 330,000,000 different deities !

At the head of this system of deities and sub-deities stands

the famous *Trimúrtti*, or Triad, of Brahmà, Vishnu, and Shiva. But why three? At first, as has been so often remarked, we seem to have the exact counterpart of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But while we need never fear to acknowledge truth because it is found in a false system of religion, in this case the apparent analogy will not bear a close examination. In the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the three equal persons of the Trinity are set forth as existing in certain relations of precedence and subordination, and as severally distinguished by certain properties peculiar to each. In the Hindoo Triad, the three are entirely independent each of the other, and are distinguished by no such peculiar properties. And it is more fatal still to the fancied analogy, that according to the Christian system the Godhead is manifested exclusively in the three persons of the Trinity ; whereas, according to the Hindoo doctrine, the Deity is manifested, not exclusively in the three members of the Triad, but in a degree greater or less in all persons whatsoever, and in the Triad only in the most eminent degree. The explanation of the Triad is to be sought, not in the region of Christian theology, but in philosophy. It is apparently as follows. All divine energy in the universe is comprehended under the three heads of origination, preservation, and destruction. The three members of the Triad severally represent these three conceptions. Hence in the Bhágavat Purána* the Deity is represented as using the following words : " As Brahmà,¹ I create ; as Vishnu, I preserve ; as Shiva, I destroy." And yet, on the other hand, as creation, preservation, and destruction may be philosophically conceived as one and the self-same act under different aspects, we find that each of these three functions, in the various sacred books of the Hindoos, is ascribed to each of the three members of the Triad. However this may be in any case, practically, in the three individuals of the Triad, God is presented to the people in the garb of personality. The unconscious Brahma indeed is not to be reached by the cries of men ; he is essentially inaccessible to motives of any kind. But Brahmà, Vishnu, and Shiva are

¹ It should be noted that Brahma and Brahmà are not the same. Brahma (in Sansk neuter) denotes the impersonal, universal being ; Brahmà (masc.) the first member of the Triad, as in the context.

accessible to motives, often indeed to very base motives. Yet as persons they seem to satisfy in some poor way the demand of the soul for a personal object of worship; and these the Vedantist offers to the people as a substitute for the true and living God, and even himself joins with the multitude in their adoration and service. The three members of the Triad have each their female counterpart or Sakti; and to these—chiefly Vishnu and Shiva, with their Saktis—the practical worship of the great mass of the Hindoos in these days is directed. Either one of these, according to the cult of the worshipper, is regarded as invested with all divine attributes; and all that exists is regarded as a manifestation of one of these three, as each one of the Triad is in fact only a mode under which men apprehend the *nirguna* Brahma. Thus, in a sublime passage in the Bhàgavad Gîta, Vishnu, incarnate in Krishna, is represented as using such words as the following:

“ I am the cause of the whole universe ;
Through me it is created and dissolved ;
On me all things within it hang suspended,
Like pearls upon a string. . . . ”¹

To which Arjuna responds in adoration, addressing him as

“ The ancient One, supreme Receptacle
Of all that is and is not, knowing all,
And to be known by all. Immensely vast,
Thou comprehendest all. Thou art the all.
To thee earth's greatest heroes must return,
Blending once more with thy resplendent essence,
Like mighty rivers rushing to the ocean.”²

All this being so, Hindooism teaches that he who would seek the boon of liberation, but is not equal to the way of knowledge, or immediate intuition of the Divine being, may yet attain this blessing mediately through the worship of Vishnu, the “ way of devotion,” or of Shiva, the “ way of works.” As regards the worship of these two deities, while Shiva's temples, containing always the phallic symbol of the ling, are indeed more common than temples to any form of Vishnu, he certainly holds no such place in the affections of the

¹ “ Indian Wisdom,” Monier Williams, p. 144.

² “ Indian Wisdom,” M. Williams, p. 148.

people. And the reason is not difficult to see. Shiva is a stern and terrible God, "hard to appease, quick to be angry." His delight is to dance in the field of battle among the heaps of the slain, adorned with a necklace of skulls and covered with the ashes of the dead. Or, again, he is the awful prince of all ascetics, remaining fixed in one position for ages in rapt contemplation, awaking from his reverie only to blast to death with a glance of fire the rash disturber of his meditations. No such God could be loved, and he is not. Vishnu, on the other hand, is a God whose usual character is mild and gentle, as befits the preserver of the world. This alone would secure him a larger measure of devotion. But there is a far more potent reason than this for the place which he holds in the modern Hindoo pantheon. That reason is to be found in the celebrated doctrine of the *avatàrs*, *lit*, "descents" or incarnations of Vishnu, whereby from time to time through the ages he is supposed to have appeared for the good of men. Here we have at first sight another striking analogy, but in reality another notable contrast with the Christian system of doctrine. Man longs not only for a God who shall be personal, but a God who shall be incarnate. That longing Hindooism has sought to meet in this doctrine of the *avatàrs* of Vishnu. In this we have the chief reason for the popularity of the second member of the Triad. The incarnations of Vishnu are commonly said to be ten in number, of which nine are past, and one is yet to come. Of all these, those of Ràma and Krishna hold by far the highest place in the esteem of the people. No vernacular books are so universally read and valued by the people in North India as the Ràmàyan of Tulsi Dàs, and the Prem Sàgar, the former of which describes the life of Ràm, and the latter of which—a translation of the Bhàgavat Puràna—sets forth the incarnation and the life of Krishna. Thus if it is by its philosophy that Hindooism holds the hearts of men, it is chiefly by its doctrine of the incarnations that it holds their affections. Let it be remembered, however, that these incarnations are explained in the strictest accord with the Vedantic philosophy. The Hindoo doctrine, therefore, as to incarnation only presents a superficial analogy with the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of Christ.

According to Christian faith, the incarnation of our Lord was sole and peculiar. Neither before, nor since, nor in time to come does Christianity know any thing of any other manifestation of God in the flesh. But the incarnation of Ràma, for example, was not so. Ràma was only one out of ten incarnations. Besides, according to the Hindoo conception, the difference between Ràma and Krishna and any other man is a difference not in essential nature, but in degree. In a greater or less degree all men, nay, all living things, and even things inanimate, are only bodily forms of the universal deity. The *avatàrs*, therefore, are only incarnations *par excellence*. The Hindoo incarnations differ still further from that of our Lord in their intent. Christ, we are taught, came to save sinners. But everywhere it is asserted that Vishnu only became incarnate to destroy sinners and to help the good. Thus the Hindoo doctrine touching incarnation resembles the Christian only in the most external and superficial manner. But it is one of the strongholds of the system. If it does not reach to the depths of man's need, it does attract the multitude, who demand a God in an embodied form. Moreover, the several incarnations are adapted to the various tastes of men. In the case of Ràma and his wife Sità, we have human characters of more than ordinary beauty. On the other hand, Krishna, as set forth in the Bhàgavat Puràna, is the incarnation of violence, licentiousness, and all iniquity, and as such stands a God after the very heart of licentious and evil men. And yet, on the contrary, in the Krishna of the Bhàgavad Gītà we see a character of quite another kind, the type of a lofty and sublime intellectuality. In a word, from among its various *avatàrs* Hindooism is able to furnish every man not only a god incarnate, but with a god after his own heart. Add to all the above the unrestricted permission by the Hindoo religion of every manner of demon and fetish worship, and it is evident that we have reached almost the utmost possible extreme of contrast and antagonism between it and the religion of Christ.

Having thus considered the philosophic basis of modern Hindooism and the practical cultus which has been erected upon it, it only remains, in order to complete the contrast

between the two religions, to refer as briefly as possible to the social institution of caste, which completes the structure. The general facts regarding caste are so well known as to make it unnecessary to enter into any great detail of statement on the subject. The original words, *jāti* and *varana*, which are commonly used in the languages of India to denote the caste distinction, both point to an idea which is central to the doctrine concerning caste, that caste is in the blood and birth. Originally four in number, the various castes have been by various causes divided and subdivided, until we now find, under the four general heads of Brāhman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shūdra, about eight hundred sub-castes, the members of which cannot intermarry, eat or drink together. Among all these, as is well known, the Brāhmans in their various divisions reign supreme. The Brāhman is supposed to be the highest manifestation of God on earth. He is commonly addressed by the deluded people as *devtā*, "god": to perform for him a menial service is a high honor; to drink the water in which he has washed his feet is deemed an exalted privilege. He may be a robber or a murderer, but he is none the less to be held in the highest reverence. One in India may see a low-caste man fall down and worship at the feet even of a Brāhman in chains! From before birth till after death, every orthodox Hindoo must pay substantial tribute to this privileged class. Their commands are to be implicitly obeyed. The Bhāgavat Purāṇa commands all men to "endure even the offences of Brāhmans." To break caste by intermarriage, or even by eating or drinking with one of a different caste, whatever his rank or social position in other respects may be, is in the eyes of most Hindoos a far more serious offence than lying, stealing, or even murder. To use a Bible phrase, "it is confusion." For the offender is reserved the extreme penalty of an ostracism which cuts him off even from the members of his own immediate family. He can only be restored by submitting to penalties so heavy as to deter thousands, who might for various reasons be glad to escape from the restrictions of caste for a season, from ever making the attempt. The never-failing philosophy is brought in to the support of a social arrangement which antedates the philosophy. For what is all this but a conspic-

uous illustration and confirmation of the doctrine as to the power of *karm* in the distribution of good and evil, high and low rank, in this life? If there were no truth in the doctrine of antecedent works and their predetermining power, whence these distinctions?

Such are the general outlines of the system of modern Hindooism. While men in India differ indeed endlessly in matters of detail, in three things the immense majority of Hindoos are quite unanimous. Above all people they are thoroughgoing and amazingly consistent pantheists. In perfect harmony therewith, their religious cultus is polytheistic, while at the same time they can admit every form of religious faith and practice, from a pure speculative atheism to those most debased forms of demon and fetish worship which prevail among the lower classes. Finally, in the social system erected on this foundation, all modern Hindoos, excepting a few reformers and certain heterodox sects, regulate all practical life by the rules of caste. But while these three elements are everywhere found in the religion of the people, they are not all equally essential to the integrity and permanence of the system. It were quite conceivable and possible that under those influences from the west which are at present so powerfully operating in India, polytheism and even caste should at last fall, and yet Hindooism in its most inward character, as a philosophic system opposed to Christianity, remain unshaken. Many a man, indeed, in India to-day worships no idol, and is none the less regarded as an orthodox Hindoo. On some religious occasions all men are released for a season from the laws of caste in respect to eating and drinking, and their caste as a general principle and fact is not thereby touched. The central and vital thing in Hindooism is the pantheistic philosophy which has been set forth. This is the very citadel of the fortress, and until Christianity has met and conquered that, she cannot be said to have conquered Hindooism. One thing should be from this discussion sufficiently clear. Hindooism and Christianity cannot both be true. They are not merely, as many would have it, different presentations of the same essential divine truth. They are not merely different

phases of one universal religion. Words have often misled men, and so it has been in this matter. The Hindoo and the Christian may both talk, as they do, of the unity of God, of an incarnation, of a Saviour, of a salvation, of heaven and a hell ; they may even speak of a new birth, and unite in affirming that the knowledge of God is the necessary means of salvation : but not in a single instance do these terms denote the same conceptions, but, on the contrary, ideas mutually exclusive. If the Christian definition of such terms be the true definition, the Hindoo's is false ; if the Hindoo is right, then we are wrong. It were well, in these days of mistaken charity especially, if this matter were better understood. But if the fact of the antagonism of the two religions be granted, then it must be admitted at once that in Hindooism, Christianity has no ordinary antagonist. As well-instructed Christians, we cannot afford to stand aloof in self-satisfied complacency and condemn Hindooism as a mere congeries of degrading and obsolescent superstitions. Not in Athens, Ephesus, or Rome did Paul find a religion of such power as that which to-day confronts the missionary in India. The religions of Greece and Rome have been born and lived out their day since the Hindoo religion had its first beginnings, and yet Hindooism lives on, and it would be hard to show that in those vital and essential features which have been indicated it presents any notable sign of decay. The Christian, therefore, instead of regarding such a system with indolent or contemptuous indifference, should rather address himself to the study of it with peculiar interest, to learn if possible the secret of its so enduring strength. It is not very hard to discover.

First, as remarked above, Hindooism alone, regarded as one of the polytheistic religions of the world, is able to justify and establish that polytheism upon a firm philosophic basis. It may not indeed be the highest conceivable type of outward religion, but for any who may choose it, if all be God, it is not unreasonable. Of peculiar strength also is the Hindoo opposition to the Christian doctrine of salvation by a vicarious sacrifice. In Christian lands the difficulty with most unbelieving theists is to see the necessity of the atonement in order to the remission of sin. They cannot see why God may not reasonably be expected to release men

from the penalties of sin upon repentance, by an act of sovereign pardon. Atonement seems to be a superfluity. To the mind of the Hindoo the case seems quite different. The idea of any such sovereign exemption of man from the consequences of his own sins is entirely foreign to his thinking. His objection to the doctrine of the atonement is not that it is not needed, but that it is in the nature of the case impossible. According to the doctrine of *karm*, every man must suffer for himself the fruit of the things done in the body. Herein Hindooism has a great advantage over many forms of western unbelief, in that, so far from ignoring or denying the testimony of conscience as to the inexorable demands of the law of the universe for the punishment of sin, it rather reaffirms it with the most solemn and tremendous emphasis.

“Tulsì, the body of man is the field and the will of man is the farmer ;

Sin and righteousness the two seeds ; as thou sowest so thou reapest at last !”

With this great law of our moral nature the Christian doctrine of the atonement seems to be in visible conflict, and thus to the Hindoo commonly the gospel of a salvation by a vicarious death appears to stand self-condemned at the bar of the universe.

Again, to men conscious of sin and apprehensive of a coming retribution, any system will stand commended which minifies or denies responsibility. This, as we have seen, Hindooism does, on the basis of three propositions—*viz.*, that there is no essential distinction between the soul and God ; that there is no such thing as free agency ; and consequently no necessary and permanent distinction between sin and righteousness. Such doctrines cannot indeed heal, but they are most effectual to narcotize the conscience. They dull and ease the acuter pangs of remorse, and deaden the sense of need of a Saviour. A system which, like Hindooism, is as an opiate to the pain of sin must needs stand strong in the faith of its votaries. Also, again, the doctrine of *mâyà*, or illusion, does much to make the Hindoo position inexpugnable. To deny or doubt the affirmations of consciousness—*e.g.*, as to freedom, personality, responsibility—were to render the very foundations of human knowledge more uncertain than sand. With

us here is the ultimate appeal in all argument and an end of all strife. But the Hindoo, by denying the dicta of consciousness, and affirming this doctrine of illusion, places himself at once beyond the reach of argument. Every missionary knows to his sorrow how at the last his adversary will always bring forth *mâyâ* as a sufficient answer to any argument and an adequate solution of every difficulty. From this panoply of illusion the keenest arguments glance off like feather shafts from a coat of mail. Still further, it is impossible that a man who has been brought to doubt the testimony of his own consciousness should be otherwise than indifferent to the truth. If the doctrine of *mâyâ* be admitted, the distinction between truth and error vanishes into thin air. If all is error, then there is no room for truth. Truth is but a mere phantom which is not worth the chasing. All things are equally true, or equally false, as you please to take it. Hence, argues the Hindoo always, all religions are alike true, and from God. Christianity is true; so also is Hindooism and Mohammedanism and every other religion. There is only the difference of a name; and if this be so, why should a man forsake the cult of his fathers, only to bring trouble and ruin on himself? It is plain that no temper of mind could well be more unfavorable to the reception of the truth than this. To a man who has come under the deadly influence of this doctrine of *mâyâ*, all argument on whatsoever subject becomes a mere logomachy. It is like the play of fencers, which has no other object than to display the agility and skill of the fencer. As yet another consequence of these same general principles and another element of the enduring strength of Hindooism, we must not overlook the marvellous assimilative power of the system. Logically and historically, it has proven itself able to incorporate into itself every manner of religious ideas and principles and adapt itself to men of every possible taste and capacity. To the philosophic intellect it presents one of the most elaborate systems of philosophy that the human mind has ever wrought out. To the mystic, seeking for union with God, it holds forth an ineffable and essential union with the Deity as the sure result of a life of pious abstraction and meditation. To the ascetic it holds forth the Deity as revealed in Shiva as the

very ideal ascetic, and at the same time the Mahàdeva or great God of men ; at once an awful model for imitation, and a mighty power by the propitiation of whom through austerities man may at last lift himself up to God. To those desiring morality and uprightness it shows the Deity in the form of Ràma Chandra, or the Krishna of the Bhàgavad Gîta, whose wise counsels have, not without reason, been sometimes compared to those of the Gospels. To the carnal and licentious it offers as a Deity the Krishna of the Bhàgavat Puràna, whose licentious sports with the cowherdesses are celebrated with song and dance throughout India ; or if any one would seek a still lower depth, yet within the limits of Hindooism, we have it in the nameless worship of the Sakti or female principle, a glorification of impurity as the most immediate means of salvation. Even for the wild fetish and demon-worshipping aboriginal tribes of the country, for the Gond and for the Mair of Ràjputànà, Hindooism has found a place. If they will but cease to eat the flesh of the cow and recognize the supremacy of the Bràhman, they may keep all that they care for in their own primitive religions, and even thereby rise in a future state of being somewhat nearer to the Deity, even to Brahmanhood itself. Finally, any dissatisfied soul would yet escape from the iron bondage of Hindooism into the larger liberty of the truth, yet around him on every side, like a deep moat without a bridge, lies the ordinance of caste. To change his religion is to renounce caste, and this touches him in every point of his outer and inner life. It means to renounce home and friends, even the nearest ; to give up in most cases even the means of a livelihood ; for the high-caste man it means to sink at one step from a position of honor in society to that of a social outcast. Thus by its institution of caste Hindooism has enlisted on its side all man's honorable pride, all his family and social affections, the very instinct of self-preservation which makes a man seek for a maintenance. Nay, for the Bràhman, caste is a part or often the whole of that by which he has his daily bread or amasses wealth. Thus the entire Brahmanical caste must needs regard the levelling truth of Christianity as Demetrius regarded the preaching of Paul at Ephesus. By this craft he has his wealth. He has no

objection, indeed, that any of his clients should worship Christ in his heart so long as he does not see that by any overt act his own supremacy is likely to be endangered. Then, tolerant hitherto, he is tolerant no longer; and to the apostate who has left his own for another religion he knows to show no mercy.

Is it a wonder that Hindooism has not yielded at once to Christianity? And can the church of Christ reasonably expect to accomplish any great success against Hindooism till she undertake the evangelization of that people with a zeal, faith, and vigor in some proportion to the almost incomparable difficulty of the work? And yet, great as is the difficulty, all in India is not antagonism. Even in those dreary desolations of pantheism one may hear oftentimes voices lifted up for the true and living God, witnessing more or less distinctly to the great truths which Christianity clearly reveals. God has not left himself without a witness, and herein have we hope.

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